Linking and the Law
7 The New Zealand position — Technological Protection Measures, Anti-circumvention and communication
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act came into force in the US in October 1998 as a response to the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty. Updated copyright legislation, including provisions relating to anti-circumvention of copy protection were enacted in the UK in 1988 and in New Zealand in 1994. In this section I shall consider the provisions of the Copyright Act that deal with Technological Protection Measures or TPMs. It will become clear as the discussion progresses that the New Zealand legislation as amended by the Copyright (New Technologies)Amendment Act 2008 addresses the issues that were raised in Reimerdes and Corley.
The discussion in this section is admittedly lengthy but necessary to understand the approach to TPMs and the way that the Legislature has attempted to address the problem. It is helpful within the context of linking because the decision in Reimerdes and Carley centreed around providing access to TPMs. A consideration of the New Zealand position, especially following the 2008 amendments to the Copyright Act will show significant differences in approach to TPMs from that in the DMCA and which would mean that the approach to linking in Reimerdes and Corley need not necessarily be applicable in New Zealand.
7.2 The Former Section 226 of the Copyright Act 1994
The provisions of the former s 226 of the Copyright Act 1994 created a right in favour of a person issuing copies (effectively a publisher). That person has the same rights as a copyright owner and the remedies that are available are provided.
Subsection (2) of s 226 defined how a person “infringes” the new right. The elements of the prohibited activity were:
• Making, selling, offering or exposing for sale or hire; or
• Advertising for sale or hire;
• Any device or means;
• Specifically designed or adapted to circumvent the form of copy protection employed; or
• Publishing information;
• With the intention to enable or assist persons to circumvent that form of copy protection;
• Knowing or having reason to believe that the devices, means, or information will be used to make infringing copies.
State of mind is significant. For the publishing of information there were two states of mind involved. First, there had to be an intention to enable or assist persons to circumvent copy protection — the specific intention. Secondly, it had to be proven that the publisher knew, or had reason to believe, that the information would be used to make infringing copies.
The prohibition on the distribution of circumvention devices involved proof of the same state of mind relating to the use of devices. There had to be knowledge (or reason to believe) that the device would be used to make infringing copies. In addition, the device had to be specifically designed or adapted to circumvent the copy protection employed. Knowledge would seem to follow from the specific design or adaptation of the device. One would hardly distribute a circumvention device specifically designed for that purpose if one did not know or have reason to believe that the device would be used for circumvention purposes.
As far as devices or means were concerned it appeared that the use of those words extended not only to hardware devices that prevented copyright infringement taking place but the software devices such as DECSS. As far as devices that have substantial non-infringing uses but incidentally include a circumvention device the situation is a little more difficult. At present DVD and Blu-Ray players have a built device that decrypts the CSS copy protection system. Imagine a DVD player/recorder that could not only play back material, but could record from a DVD as well. The CSS decoding system would be present for legitimate and authorised playback provisions. Thus the machine would be specifically designed to circumvent copy protection. But such a use would be authorised. Then there is the recording use. For liability to follow there would have to be specific knowledge on the part of the distributor of such a device that it would be used to make infringing copies. The mere presence of a circumvention means or device is not enough. It must be accompanied by the requisite knowledge or reason to believe.
The provision of information about circumvention means or devices was limited by two state of mind requirements that, arguably, would mean that the publication of, for example, academic research regarding circumvention technologies would not be caught by the section if:
• the intention to enable or assist circumvention were absent; and/or
• there was an absence of knowledge or reason to believe that the publication would be used to make infringing copies.
Thus, when we consider the examples the scope of the former section was somewhat narrower than it first appeared.
7.3 The 2008 Amendment
The 2008 Amendment of s 226 and following amendments have made a number of changes. The first is that definitions have been provided. The second is that the essence of the former s 226 is retained in s 226A.
The focus of the new s 226 continues to be on the link between circumvention and copyright infringement and on the making, sale and hire of devices or information rather than on the act of actual circumvention. Actual circumvention is not prohibited, but any unauthorised use of the material that is facilitated by circumvention continues to be an infringement of copyright.
The new amendments recognise that consumers should be able to make use of materials under the permitted acts, or view or execute a non-infringing copy of a work. This is consistent with New Zealand’s position on parallel importation of legitimate goods; for example, genuine DVDs from other jurisdictions. New provisions have also been introduced to enable the actual exercise of permitted acts where TPMs have been applied.
What the new TPM provisions do is two-fold — broadly they prohibit and criminalise.
There is a prohibition of commercial conduct that undermines the TPM by putting a circumvention device into circulation or providing a service including the publication of information which relates to overriding TPM protection. Contravention has civil consequences — specifically the issue of the work protected by a TPM is protected as if the conduct was an infringement of copyright. The second leg is to make the prohibited conduct a criminal offence.
There is a knowledge element for both the prohibition and the offence — the knowledge of the use to which the circumvention device or the service or published information will, or is likely to, be put.
There are however some limits on the prohibition when circumvention device has a legitimate use.
7.3.1 The Definitions
There are three definitions which are applicable to ss 226A–226E. The first is a technological protection measure or TPM:
TPM or technological protection measure—
(a) means any process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system that in the normal course of its operation prevents or inhibits the infringement of copyright in a TPM work; but
(b) for the avoidance of doubt, does not include a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that, in the normal course of operation, it only controls any access to a work for non-infringing purposes (for example, it does not include a process, treatment, mechanism, device, or system to the extent that it controls geographic market segmentation by preventing the playback in New Zealand of a non-infringing copy of a work)
Significantly, the legislature differentiated between a TPM for the purposes of the prevention of infringement and one that relates to access to a work for non-infringing purposes. The example is given of the control of “geographic market segmentation”, which clearly relates to a region protection in games or DVDs. Thus, if a person legitimately acquired a DVD that was coded for region 1, the region coding device or process in the DVD player which would otherwise prevent the use of the DVD may be circumvented so that the non-infringing purpose of viewing the DVD could be carried out.
The second definition relates to a TPM circumvention device:
TPM circumvention device means a device or means that—
(a) is primarily designed, produced, or adapted for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention of a technological protection measure; and
(b) has only limited commercially significant application except for its use in circumventing a technological protection measure
The primary purpose of the circumvention device must be to circumvent a TPM — taking into account that the TPM must prevent infringement rather than access for non-infringing purposes and as well as its primary design production or adaptation it must have limited commercially significant application other than for its use in circumventing a TPM.
Both paras (a) and (b) are conjunctive; it may well be that a TPM circumvention device may have other commercially significant applications or, as the Americans put it, substantial non-infringing uses.
The third definition relates to a TPM work which is defined as a copyright work that is protected by a TPM. A TPM work must be a copyright work but it may well be that this cannot prevent a entrepreneur locking up a public domain work with a TPM if there is some significance in the way in which the work has been typographically arranged.
7.3.2 The Operative Sections
Section 226A sets out the prohibited conduct in relation to a TPM, stating:
226A Prohibited conduct in relation to technological protection measure
(1) A person (A) must not make, import, sell, distribute, let for hire, offer or expose for sale or hire, or advertise for sale or hire, a TPM circumvention device that applies to a technological protection measure if A knows or has reason to believe that it will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
(2) A person (A) must not provide a service to another person (B) if—
(a) A intends the service to enable or assist B to circumvent a technological protection measure; and
(b) A knows or has reason to believe that the service will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
(3) A person (A) must not publish information enabling or assisting another person to circumvent a technological protection measure if A intends that the information will be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
Section 226A provides a useful example of modern statutory drafting techniques by clarifying the behaviours of the certain actors that the section addresses.
Section 226A(1) is identical in scope to the former s 226(1), with the exception that the definitions contained in the new s 226 impact upon the scope. Whereas the previous legislation referred to a form of copy protection, the definition of a TPM work, a TPM and a TPM circumvention device now govern.
Section 226A(2) relates to the publishing information limb of the former s 226, except that a new term (“service”) is used. This is undefined but clearly encompasses information.
Once again there are two limbs underlying the prohibition: the intention that the service enable or assists circumvention of TPM; and specific knowledge that the service will or is likely to be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
If the service is for the purposes of university research, it is difficult to imagine that B could be satisfied, thus the prohibitive conduct is not complete.
The use of the word “service” in s. 226A(2) is new. The earlier iteration used the words “device” or “means”. Service is a very wide concept and although s. 226A(3) refers to the publication of information to enable or assist another person to circumvent a TPM, service extends the scope of s. 226A(1) and in essence addresses any form of assistance enabling circumvention of a TPM accompanied by knowledge or reason to believe that the assistance or service will be used to infringe copyright. There seems to be little doubt that a “service” could concveivably encompass a computer program or code.
Section 226A(3) relates specifically to the publication of information, and although the behaviour could be encompassed by a service, the legislature saw fit to make publication of information about TPM circumvention a discreet behaviour.
There is only one knowledge element in s 226A(3), as opposed to the two in s 226A(2). That knowledge element is that person A must know that the provider of the information must intend that the information is to be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work. Thus s 226A prohibits:
• the making or distribution of a TPM;
• the provision of a service with the two limbs of intention to assist circumvention and knowledge that the service will be or likely to be used to circumvent; and
• publication of information enabling circumvention if it is intended that information will be used to circumvent.
Unlike the original s.226, which was restricted in the language to commercial activity (sells, lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire or advertises for sale or hire) s. 226A prohibits not only the making, selling, letting for hire, offering or exposing for sake, but also prohibits importing or distributing a TPM circumvention device. These terms can encompass an individual who downloads a TPM circumvention device from an off-shore site. This was not thje case in the earlier legislation. Distibution is also prohibite3d. Thus if one makes a TPM circumvention device available for download from a website, and uses a link to facilitate delivery, such an action could fall within the ambit or “distribution”.
However, the provision of information has a commercial aspect to it, for the provision of such information must be “in the course of business” and is therefore of a narrower scope that had those words been omitted.
Section 226B sets out the rights that accrue to the issuer of a TPM work. These rights are what Kirby J referred to as para copyright in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment. Essentially, the issue of a TPM work has the same rights against a person who contravenes s 226A as the copyright owner has in respect of infringement. The provisions of the Copyright Act relating to delivery up in civil or criminal proceedings is available to the issuer of a TPM work as are certain presumptions that are contained in ss 126–129 of the Copyright Act. The provisions of s 134 relating to disposing of infringing copies or objects applies as well with the necessary modifications.
Absent from the 1994 version of s 226 was the offence of contravening s 226A. Section 226C creates that offence:
226C Offence of contravening section 226A
(1) A person (A) commits an offence who, in the course of business, makes, imports, sells, distributes, lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire, or advertises for sale or hire, a TPM circumvention device that applies to a technological protection measure if A knows that it will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
(2) A person (A) commits an offence who, in the course of business, provides a service to another person (B) if—
(a) A intends the service to enable or assist B to circumvent a technological protection measure; and
(b) A knows that the service will, or is likely to, be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
(3) A person (A) commits an offence who, in the course of business, publishes information enabling or assisting another person to circumvent a technological protection measure if A intends that the information will be used to infringe copyright in a TPM work.
(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding $150,000 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both.
The first important thing to note is that subs (4) requires the conviction to be on indictment, so the matter must be dealt with in the jury jurisdiction and cannot be dealt with summarily although the position may well be altered by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011..
Section 226C mirrors the prohibitions in s 226A, but the critical matter for an offence is that there is a commercial element — “in the course of business”.
Similarly, the provision of the service in subs (2) of 226C must have a commercial element as must the publication of information in subs (3).
This then brings the criminalisation of para-copyright in line with the provisions of s 135 of the Copyright Act which relates to piracy or commercial infringement. Clearly, s 226D considers that the offence should relate to commercial activity involving TPMs. In this way the rather wider prohibitions contained in s. 226A do not automatically lead to potential liability under s. 226C
Section 226D clarifies the position relating to the scope of the rights of the issuer of a TPM work. The operative part states:
226D When rights of issuer of TPM work do not apply
(1) The rights that the issuer of a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act.
(2) The rights that the issuer of a TPM work has under section 226B do not prevent or restrict the making, importation, sale, or letting for hire of a TPM circumvention device to enable—
(a) a qualified person to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 using a TPM circumvention device on behalf of the user of a TPM work; or
(b) a person referred to in section 226E(3) to undertake encryption research.
(3) In this section and in section 226E, qualified person means—
(a) the librarian of a prescribed library; or
(b) the archivist of an archive; or
(c) an educational establishment; or
(d) any other person specified by the Governor-General by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister.
(4) A qualified person must not be supplied with a TPM circumvention device on behalf of a user unless the qualified person has first made a declaration to the supplier in the prescribed form.
The issuer of a TPM work cannot prevent or restrict the exercise of a permitted act. Nor can the prohibition prevent or restrict the making, importation, sale or letting for hire of a TPM circumvention device to enable encryption research under s 226E(3), or to enable a qualified person to exercise a permitted act using a TPM circumvention device.
The legislation goes on to define “qualified person”, who, in this case, is required to make a declaration relating to certain matters.
On their own the provisions of s 226D seem confusing, although the provisions of s 226 and following do not prohibit the act of circumvention. Subsection (1) of 226D makes it clear that circumvention may be permissible for the purposes of the exercise of a permitted act.
Section 226E takes the matter further.
226E User’s options if prevented from exercising permitted act by TPM
(1) Nothing in this Act prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to exercise a permitted act under Part 3.
(2) The user of a TPM work who wishes to exercise a permitted act under Part 3 but cannot practically do so because of a TPM may do either or both of the following:
(a) apply to the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee for assistance enabling the user to exercise the permitted act:
(b) engage a qualified person (see section 226D(3)) to exercise the permitted act on the user’s behalf using a TPM circumvention device, but only if the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee has refused the user’s request for assistance or has failed to respond to it within a reasonable time.
(3) Nothing in this Act prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to undertake encryption research if that person—
(a) is either—
(i) engaged in a course of study at an educational establishment in the field of encryption technology; or
(ii) employed, trained, or experienced in the field of encryption technology; and
(b) has either—
(i) obtained permission from the copyright owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright to the use of a TPM circumvention device for the purpose of the research; or
(ii) has taken, or will take, all reasonable steps to obtain that permission.
(4) A qualified person who exercises a permitted act on behalf of the user of a TPM work must not charge the user more than a sum consisting of the total of the cost of the provision of the service and a reasonable contribution to the qualified person’s general expenses.
Once again the section makes it clear that the act of circumvention to exercise a permitted act is not prohibited. Thus a person may use a circumvention device to copy a selection from a TPM work for the purposes of review, a comment or inclusion (with attribution) in an academic work.
Subsection (2) glosses over that, however. If the user of a TPM work wishes to exercise a permitted act, he or she may use a TPM circumvention device to do so, but the subsection includes the words “but cannot practically do so because of a TPM”. It is unclear what this means. If a person whose access to a work to carry out a permitted act is prevented by a TPM, does subs (2) automatically apply? Or, if a circumvention device is available, is the user able to use that circumvention device to exercise the permitted act? Does subs (2) relate to the situation where there is no circumvention device available? Subsection (2), in providing certain options for the person who is stymied by a TPM, challenges the market failure theory of fair use.
A person wishing to do one of the permitted acts may apply to the copyright owner or licensee for assistance. The alternative is to engage a qualified person (see s 226D(3)) to exercise a permitted act on the user’s behalf using a circumvention device. But that can only apply if the copyright owner exclusive licensee refuses the user’s request for assistance or fail to respond within a reasonable time.
A sensible interpretation of s 226E suggests that subs (2) must be followed if there is no readily available circumvention device enabling the user to exercise a permitted act.
It is also important to note that s 226E makes a specific exception for the use of circumvention devices to undertake encryption research in certain circumstances.
The new provisions of s 226 and following are indeed helpful. The incorporation of clear definitions, that make it clear that TPMs are for the purposes of prevention of infringement rather than access, are to be welcomed (although s 226E seems to introduce a somewhat unnecessary level of complexity).
Underlying the whole issue of para-copyright is the fact that, in reality, TPMs are a somewhat blunt instrument for the purposes of copyright protection, presenting an “all or nothing” level of protection. TPMs cannot discriminate between a permitted or prohibited use. They are international and are applied internationally, whereas copyright law is territorial. TPMs place the control in the hands of the copyright owner of a technological rather than a legal nature and, as already observed, provide a potential for market failure. Essentially, TPMs do not provide an absolute protection, rather they impose another layer of protection that sits on top of the balance of interests created by statute, and muddy the waters between what is and is not allowed. The various options relating to behaviour regarding TPMs contained in ss 226B, 226D and 226E suggest that certain behaviours may be permissible while others are not. Clearly, the legislature did not want to impose a prohibition on the act of circumvention, but the various alternatives given in ss 226D and 226E seem to suggest prohibition.
The legislation, while addressing the issue of circumvention of TPMs, and restricting prohibited conduct to the means by which copyright protection (rather than access prevention) may be circumvented therefore makes it clear that the provisions of means by which access controls may be circumvented is not within the scope of prohibited conduct. This means that one may provide services, information and programs that assist in circumventing access protections. In this way the legislation addresses its target – the copy right – rather than allowing the engraftment of another “para-copyright” – the “prevention of access” right. This is eminently justifiable. Region coding is a means by which copyright owners facilitate distribution of their products. The only issue is obne of market segmentation and a release strategy that copyright owners may have in place. There is no reason, in terms of copyright, why a person who legitimately acquires content in one geographical area should be prohibited from accessing it in another.
However, unlike the New Zealand legislation the DMCA prohibits thje circumvention of access control systems, despite there being no copyright implications and, to further complicate matters, criminalises such behaviour. It should be a matter of concern that should international trade treaty negotiations result in the application of a DMCA style of anti-TPM circumvention regime, the results will be:
a) the imposition of a foreign marketing system that goes far beyond those chosen say for the release of non-digital product such as movies and CDs
b) the end of the parallel importing regime insofar as geographically segmented digital product is concerned
c) the criminalisation of behaviour that has nothing to do with copyright infringement and has no economic implications for content owners whatsoever.
Finally, it is still not clear whether licence terms or conditions of sale may override the way in which circumvention devices may be used in the limited situations provided in s 226. Unlike s 84, which statutorily negates such conditions, the matter is left open. The legislature has gone to considerable lengths to ensure the balance of interests that underlies copyright law is maintained. It seems unusual that those rights may be subverted by contractual arrangements.
 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
 The Copyright Act 1994 as amended by the Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008
 CSS is the DVD content scrambling system that prohibits the copying of the files on a DVD movie disk. DECSS is the system that circumvents the content scrambling system.
 The offence of contravening s 226A is set out in s 226C.
 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment  HCA 58, (2005) 224 CLR 193, (2005) 221 ALR 448.