This paper is about a collision between the culture and symbolism that accompanies the administration of law and technologies that enable change and a different way of doing things yet are the focus of resistance. I argue that this resistance at its heart is cultural and has little to do with legal doctrine.
The particular technologies that I shall discuss are communications technologies that enable and facilitate remote hearings where the participants need not attend a courthouse for a hearing of their dispute. The resistance is, as I have suggested, cultural and is based upon a number of factors including the way in which the imagination and the image of the Court as a symbol is represented and the role that imagery plays in the perception of the delivery of justice.
This cultural aspect also has relevance on the way in which the Rule of Law is perceived within the context of the “Court as a Place”. I argue that whatever imperatives may have underpinned the “Court as a Place” model of the delivery of justice, they are no longer as relevant or meaningful as they once might have been and that new communications technologies allow us to reimagine and revisit the way in which justice is delivered.
Justice, the law and the Rule of Law have been characterized as a “looming omnipresence in the sky” in the sense that although associated with rules governing the behaviour of individuals and groups within society it has certain intangible aspects that render it a somewhat slippery customer. Yet it fulfils a role within government structures and provides a system for the resolution of disputes between individuals and groups or between the State and the individual.
Although, as I shall argue, there is an air of mysticism and symbolic ritual that surrounds the law and legal process, in its most essential and most basic manifestation the legal process is an exercise in information exchange. I argue that the means by which information is exchanged has had an impact upon the way in which the legal process has developed.
We are now in the Digital Paradigm with all the various different means of communication that are now available. These include the tools for remote working which allow us to reimagine the way in which the Court operates and yet maintain those information flows that are essential to the legal and judicial process.
I argue that resistance to such reimagining is primarily cultural that includes a reluctance to move from what could be called a cultural comfort zone. I further argue that there is a certain inevitability that remote hearings increase in frequency and become normalized as part of the process. Underpinning this argument is the fact that new communications technologies shape our communications behaviours which in turn influence or modify our values and our acceptance of different ways of doing things. The argument is summed up in Marshall McLuhan’s aphorism “we shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us”.
Given that a court hearing is an information exchange, I shall argue that the assumptions that underpin the “Court as a Place” model or hearing may give way to what Professor Richard Susskind calls the “Court as a Service”.
I shall argue that those who prefer the “Court as a Place” model must be honest in recognizing that their adherence to that model is based upon deep-seated cultural preferences and assumptions about what the technology can do rather than upon any legal imperative.
The Rule of Law as a Benchmark for Technological Innovation
There is a school of thought that suggests that rather than rushing to embrace new technologies in the justice process, some caution should be employed in evaluating those technologies and whether they fulfil the objectives of the rule of law.
The Chief Justice of New Zealand Dame Helen Winkelmann sets out a number of criteria that should be considered and against which new technological developments should be measured before their acceptance and deployment into the justice system. However, the onset of the Covid 19 crisis accelerated the deployment of remote working facilities out of necessity, simply to keep the Court system, or aspects of it, running.
When read alongside an earlier paper that she delivered to the Criminal Bar Association Conference in August of 2019, the Chief Justice develops a theme that, whilst not necessarily suggesting that there should be little use of technology in the courts, suggests a certain conservatism, a desire to maintain existing systems and an underlining sub-text that present systems, as far as they can be, fulfil the objectives of the rule of law.
One of the abiding principles present in both papers is the recognition by the Chief Justice of the importance of physical presence by all the participants in the court system in the one place at the one time. This focuses, therefore, attention upon the concept of the “court as a place” that fulfils a number of functions, some of them substantive, some of them procedural and some of them symbolic.
This runs up against the views of Professor Richard Susskind, who considers that the courts of the future should be seen as “courts as a service” and that place should not matter. In this regard, the Chief Justice, in her January 2020 paper, addresses directly and obliquely some of the issues that are raised by Professor Susskind in his advocacy for an on-line court or remote working system.
There can be no dispute with the proposition that the Rule of Law must be the standard against which technological innovation should be measured. The question that must be posed is whether the innovation proposed enhances or detracts from the performance by the courts of this task.
In a State living under the Rule of Law, the laws administered by the court must have a certain substantive content, affording adequate protection of fundamental human rights. These human rights are necessary pre-conditions for equal access to the protection of law before the courts but it is argued that there is another element, which is that if society’s laws do not afford protection for these rights then those who sit outside the law’s protection have no reason to accept those laws or the decision of the courts. Social cohesion, it is argued, is a necessary pre-condition to the rule of law and it is suggested that physical presence enhances that social cohesion.
The Courts as a Manifestation of the Rule of Law
Rather than providing a service, as suggested by Professor Susskind, the Chief Justice considers that the work the Courts do is more than that and is in fact a public good requiring a public performance by way of hearings in a local courthouse, involving participation and human interaction, which affords human dignity to those involved in civil and criminal proceedings.
This emphasis upon the “performance” aspect of the law is one of a number of criteria that support the way in which the Courts administer the Rule of Law. Among these aspects are
- The existence of an independent judiciary.
- The public administration of law.
- The importance of the local courthouse to the rule of law
- The work of lawyers is critical to supporting the rule of law
- That the court hearing is a public demonstration of the rule of law in action
- Public hearings exemplify fairness and legality
If technological innovation does not enhance one or more of these elements of the Rule of Law, then it can have no place within the system. The list of items all have certain common elements to them. The law must be administered in public – the transparency issue that I shall discuss shortly. That transparency, it is argued, requires a courthouse, with its attendant symbolism which I shall shortly consider. Lawyers are a part of that performance rite which demonstrates the law in action – again harking back to transparency – and fair and public hearings demonstrating this important aspect of the Rule of Law process.
Thus, to summarise the point thus far, within the Rule of Law model proposed there is an emphasis upon the public administration of justice, the importance of the courthouse as a symbol and the court hearing as a public demonstration of the rule of law – what is describes as the performative aspect or what I have characterised as the performance rite.
But does transparency involve the physical presence of all the participants in the same place at the same time? I suggest that it does not, and that the element of transparency can be achieved utilising technology.
The Court has evolved as location where citizens go – or are taken – to air their disputes or have them resolved in a manner that is largely open and available. Thus, one of the criticisms of Remote Court Hearings (RCH) and the Online Court (OC) is the lack of transparency and thus represents an affront to open justice represented by public hearings.
Open justice and transparency suggest visibility of Court processes, procedures and operations, of information about the Courts such as data about cases and volumes as well as scheduling and the cost to the taxpayer.
The public should have access to advance notice of hearings, to a record of proceedings and information about the business before the Courts along with the substance of a determination or decision and an explanation or reasons for a decision.
Traditionally, hearings have been in a public forum in all but exceptional circumstances and the media should be present to report proceedings as surrogates of the public. This is what Professor Susskind refers to as “real-time transparency.”
The remote hearing is criticized because it challenges “real time transparency”. In a completely on-line court there is no physical courtroom into which the public or media may venture. The question is whether or not this suggested “threat” is a real one.
The reality is that real-time transparency is more limited today than is acknowledged. We trumpet the openness and availability of courts but policies that involve closing down court houses and centralizing the administration of justice remove that aspect of transparency from local communities.
The difficulties in actually travelling to a Courthouse to benefit from that so-called transparency has its own problems including the availability of public transport or, if a private car is used, parking in a busy urban location. Only in cases of high profile criminal trials do members of the public present exceed the capacity of the courtroom to seat them. In most criminal cases those present are directly affected – complainants and their inevitable support networks or families of the accused.
This suggested loss of transparency suggests, in the minds of critics, that hearings will take place in secret giving rise to suggestions of “Star Chamber justice”.
This is patently unsustainable. With the multitude of communications platforms available Court hearings can be broadcast online. The case of State of Washington v Trump before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals was broadcast over Internet platforms to an audience of over 131,000 people. In addition none of the Judges were in the same place but teleconferenced in to the hearing.
The issue of open justice and transparency can be addressed by providing for a stream of proceedings before the Court if there is a full hearing or, if the decision is “on the papers” the online publication of the reasons for a decision.
The Covid 19 crisis immediately challenged the concept of transparency of Court proceedings by virtue of distancing and gathering requirements as well as restrictions on travel. Although the Courts in New Zealand were considered an essential service, adaptations had to be made. In many cases defendants in criminal courts appeared by way of Audio-Visual links (AVL). Counsel were “present” by way of virtual meeting room or conferencing software that allowed for audio and video. In some case even the Judge appeared remotely as distinct from sitting in a Courtroom.
Importantly the media were able to join the Court remotely and participate in being able to observe and report the hearings as they might have done in real-time. Indeed, the ability of the news media to “attend” a number of courts without leaving news desks actually enhanced the ability of the media to report Court proceedings and act as surrogates of the public.
It may be seen from these examples that concerns about transparency that are associated with “real-time” courts have little substance in the face of technological solutions that are available for remote working.
A Fair Trial?
But there are some deeper criticisms of the RCH or OC model. Can a RCH or the OC deliver a fair trial. This raises the question of whether or not the work of the Courts must be conducted on a face to face basis to achieve a just outcome.
The question becomes one of whether the public hearing is equated with a physical one. Professor Susskind suggests that our concept of “public” has evolved as communications technology has improved. Online access to meetings, lectures and events is considered “public”.
This has moved even further during the Covid 19 crisis when, for example, the Auckland Theatre Company “staged” an online and very public version of Chekhov’s “The Seagull” to international acclaim. The New Zealand Symphony Orchestra performed online concerts during the Covid 19 lockdown and has and as at the date of writing continues to present very public performances online. Thus, the Internet provides an element of public participation in terms of performance and the gathering of information.
The public perception of the administration of justice – of fair process and fair trial- through the Court system has four basic elements – all of them procedural. They are that all cases should be treated alike; that parties should be given the opportunity to state their case before a Judge who has no personal interest in the dispute; judges should be impartial and work within a judicial system that is independent and that cases should be judged and not the parties.
The issue is whether these elements require, as a pre-condition, first, a physical presence on the part of participants and secondly, that presence in a structure or building that is largely symbolic and associated with a number of seemingly arcane rituals that are the province of a select priesthood – the lawyers.
What is more important, it is suggested, is that the decisions of the Courts are fair, the processes are fair and in accordance with the rules of natural justice, that the participants are satisfied that they are so and that access to the courts is available across the community at an affordable cost.
Perceptions of Participation
The remote working model, it is argued, challenges the importance of litigants being treated with dignity and respect and the importance of human interaction between litigant lawyer and Judge.
The argument is that the on-line or remote working model challenges parties’ perception of participation and the critical importance of the presentation of one’s case in court. These perceptions have a common theme which is that of the level of engagement that may take place during a Court hearing and the impact of a remote appearance as opposed to an “in person” one.
Associated with the level of engagement are what could be termed participatory elements operate at a more visceral level and could be summed up in the terms “the day in court” and “the face to face hearing” which has its origins in the concept of confrontation between accuser and accused. I shall first discuss the level of engagement and then proceed to consider the elements of the “day in court” and “the face to face hearing”. I suggest that none of these issues are compromised by a remote hearing.
Level of Engagement
This aspect could be described as the “level of engagement” and that an appearance remotely may mean that the participant is not as fully “present” as she or he may be in person.
Once again, the Covid 19 experience is instructive. Counsel have certainly shown as great a level of engagement working remotely as if they were present in Court. The amusing observation by one defence lawyer that she wore a working blouse and blazer on top and track pants out of shot seemed to have little impact upon her level of engagement in a 90 minute opposed bail application.
It has been my observation as a Judge dealing with accused persons via an AVL link that they are as engaged as if they were present in person – perhaps even more so for they are able to remain focussed on what is occurring on the screen rather than having informal and signalled communications with friends or family members in Court.
Lambie and Hyland discuss the importance of these early interactions with the Court.
“the pre-trial period should be viewed in New Zealand as it is in other jurisdictions; as a window of opportunity to provide the appropriate wrap around service provision that is required by the individual and their whanau”.
However important that part of the process might be, and I agree that it is, I do not see that a remote appearance compromises the matters raised by Lambie and Hyland. As I have observed, the level of engagement is just as high with a remote appearance as it is with an in person one.
In some respects the level of engagement can be higher in that the positioning and size of the screens upon which people appear can play a part. Professor Susskind referred to the value of a large high definition screen. My only observation about that in the context of the New Zealand Courts in general and the District Court in particular is the positioning of screens which should, as much as possible, reflect the positioning of the participants as if they were present in person. This is a matter which will have to be addressed in Courtroom design or configuration if remote hearings are to continue and become a part of the Courtroom toolbox.
Another matter raised is that of trustworthiness but what really could be described as empathy where there is a perception that the decision-maker actually cares about the case. This arises as a result of the dynamic of the hearing but could be as applicable to the online as to the in-person experience.
Finally, there is the issue of neutrality, which can take place within the context of an oral hearing in which the parties have an opportunity to be heard and where the Judge is seen to be paying equal attention to the arguments of each side. This is an important aspect of the “level of engagement” issue.
Participants must also remember that, as in a physical courtroom, they are always “on” and care must be taken to behave in an engaging, interesting, respectful manner.
These latter matters fold into another issue about participation and that is the sense that litigants are entitled to their “day in court”. This phrase carries within it a number of elements. One of them, fundamental to the Rule of Law argument, is that everyone should have access to the court process for the resolution of a dispute. But does that mean physical presence or rather the availability of the services that the Court offers?
The “Day in Court”
Will remote hearings or remote “presence” will deprive litigants of their “day in Court” or access to the dispute resolution services that the Court provides. The first point to be made is that remote hearings or remote participation should be seen as one means of allowing for “presence” at a hearing. It is not suggested that all hearings should be conducted remotely.
A remote hearing would offer much of the essence of the physical presence offered by day in court, particularly as remote video technology improves. It would also offer a remote day in court to those facing difficulties in personal attendance. The growth and development of remote communication and familiarity with getting information from a screen may make determination of substantive legal rights in circumstances other than face to face less of a departure from the cultural norm than may be perceived at present.
The real question is whether or not we are prepared to deny citizens access to the services of the Court because of their inability to be physically present. Quaestio caedit.
The “Face to Face” Hearing
The “Face to face” hearing is based on the assumption that remote hearings will deprive litigants of “face to face” justice. This could well be a misunderstanding of the nature of the so-called confrontation right and is an argument based more upon tradition and a reliance upon earlier paradigms than any rational justification.
The concept of the “human face” of justice is considered significant. This has been advanced by Dr. Ian Lambie and Olivia Hyland in two articles and has been articulated by Andrew Langdon QC in his inaugural speech as Chairman of the Bar of England and Wale who said:
“The humanity of physical presence is, I suggest, an important component in the delivery of justice…Being in the physical presence of a witness or a jury or a defendant or a Judge or your lawyers …..isn’t that fundamental to our innate sense of how justice should be delivered?…Justice has a human face, and its not a face on a screen…Many smaller cases benefit from getting everyone together in one place. The dynamic between the parties becomes evident; whether one side is unfairly dominating the other, whether one party is as well-heeled as the other.”
The underlying themes of these comments are that justice must be done in person, the participants must be able to look one another in the eye, claimants and victims need to meet face to face, the humanity of justice can only be done in a largely symbolic centrally located building, justice is personal and the playing field is levelled by physical presence.
Recent developments arising out of the Covid 19 crisis have demonstrated some of the fallacies about the necessity for physical presence. I have noted the evidence of Professor Richard Susskind to House of Lords Constitutional Committee, where he commented on the fact that remote hearings could be used to determine credibility issues and noted the advantages of the full-screen view of a witness.
Susskind also raises the issue of the fact that one may get a sense of a person’s credibility and their demeanour by looking at them on a high definition screen where the video is close to the face. It should be noted in this context that there have been some critics of the importance of demeanour in the fact finding process. A considerable amount of importance is placed by some on demeanour. Does the insight that a Judge may gain from seeing a witness face to face be as frequent or as accurate a perception in the remote hearing.
The issue of demeanour as a guide to truth telling and the reliance upon non-verbal cues as an aid to assessing credibility has been the subject of a considerable body of literature from the field of the behavioural science, and the overwhelming conclusion is that demeanour is not a useful guide to veracity.
There is no philosophical nor empirical justification for a need for face-to-face interaction – especially in the Internet age. The rules of natural justice are not threatened by the remote hearing model and there is certainly no constitutional principle that requires that justice can only be achieved where there is a form of face to face resolution. The issue of the “face to face” critique is met by the deployment of video systems to create a “virtual” or “online” court and the improvements in technology as noted by Professor Susskind may well enhance the evidence giving process.
There can be no doubt that the critics of RCH or OC believe that a move away from physical hearings is a retrograde – indeed fatal – step for the administration of justice. For most of our lives we have one conception of the resolution of disputes through the Court process. We have become attached to the environment that has provided us with careers and for a great many with prosperity. It is hard to conceive that there may be radically different ways of achieving the same outcome. We are culturally attuned to our way of attempting to achieve justice and in many respects we tend to support that cultural acclimatization with almost mythical and symbolic elements.
The cultural aspect of presence-based arguments have developed over a period of centuries. They have developed within the context of the availability, or lack of availability, of different systems of communication.
The oral hearing arose because that was the only way in which a dispute could be litigated as the court system was developing many centuries ago. Only when new technologies came into play, such as the development of the printing press and its impact upon law and legal culture, were there small and incremental changes in legal culture.
One of these changes involved reliance upon printed materials as a record of what the law was. As Lord Camden said in Entick v Carrington “if it is not in our books it is not the law” and, in saying that, he was summing up the importance of the printed record as law as opposed to the concept of immemorial custom that had been a feature of earlier iterations of the development of the English legal system.
Up until the 1930s and the development of digital systems, all of our communications took place within the context of what could be described of analogue systems such as print, radio, wireless, television and the like. Only when the internet went public in the early 1990s did the real digital revolution take place.
Within this context, the number of different methods and systems of communication arose – all of them deploying digital technologies. This may not mean a lot but, in fact, it is important when we consider that the presentation of a court case, with all of the cultural aspects referred to, involves an information exchange. The advantages of new technologies are that the abilities to engage in that information exchange are enhanced and improved.
It is to the cultural and sub-conscious preferences for the in-person model that I shall now turn.
In the next section I shall develop the argument that many of the reasons for opposition to remote hearings and online courts are based on cultural habits and expectations rather than having anything to do with the integrity of the law.
Legal culture, in its most general sense, is one describing relatively stable patterns of oriented social behavior and attitudes. The identifying elements of legal culture range from facts about institutions such as the number and role of lawyers or the way judges are appointed and controlled, to various forms of behaviour such as litigation or prison rates, and at the other extreme, more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities. Like culture itself, legal culture is about who we are, not just what we do.
In this section I shall consider the way in which legal culture is represented in image and otherwise to demonstrate some of the ways in which the Rule of Law is represented that has little to do with its real purpose but rather creates a psychological mythology of how those in power wish the law to be perceived by those whom it governs.
Court, Culture and Information
The trial is the law’s high theatre. The Courtroom is a stage and the participants are the players. Some, such as witnesses, have bit parts. Some are major players – on stage throughout the whole performance. It is little wonder that trials – especially criminal trials – feature so frequently in literature and in entertainment. The trial scene in Shakespeare’s ”Merchant of Venice” is gripping drama as well as being a showpiece for a number of jurisprudential theories. The trial is a set piece in Harper Lee’s “To Kill a Mockingbird” and the film “Witness for the Prosecution” is the trial itself. The trial dynamic brings all the players into the one place, with the classic dramatic formulae of human interactions, conflict and denoument. Television is replete with lawyer shows in which trials feature – “Rumpole of the Bailey” and “Silk” provide two examples.
Of course the trial is more than that. It is a critical part of a State provided dispute resolution process that has evolved over the centuries and is characterised by elegantly moderated reasoned arguments supported by specialised information which lawyers call evidence.
In the same way that the practice of law involves the acquisition, processing, sharing and communication of information, likewise Court proceedings are all about information. Information takes certain forms, be it by way of pleadings which inform the Court what the dispute is about, evidence which informs the Court as to the strength of the assertions contained in the pleadings, submissions by which the Court is informed as to the possible approaches that it may adopt in determining the outcome, and from the Court to the lawyers and the parties when it delivers a decision. In the course of processing the decision the Judge or Judges will embark upon their own information acquisition activities, looking up the law, checking the assertions or alternatively having recourse to an internal information exchange involving Judges’ Clerks.
Thus, a court is not only a place of adjudication, but also an information hub. Information is assembled, sorted and brought to the courtroom for presentation. Once presented, various theories of interpretation are put before the fact-finder, who then analyses the data according to prescribed rules, and determines a verdict and result. That result, often with collateral consequences, is then transmitted throughout the legal system as required either by law reports, academic comment or on-line legal information systems. The court is thus the centre of a complex system of information exchange and management.
Courts and Communication
Historically the conduct of a Court hearing has involved an oral exchange. This practice developed simply because there was no other way to convey information. Those who had a grievance would bring it before the chieftain or ruler and would seek redress. What we understand as the Rule of Law in its most embryonic form was to prevent the destruction of the members of a community or even the community itself by retribution or blood feuds.
Judges became the proxy for the ruler or, in the case of England, the King. Whereas the King would hear disputes in his court, so Judges adopted “the court” as the central place for hearing and resolving disputes. In England the Royal Courts occupied sections of Westminster Hall. The King’s Judges did not sit permanently in the Courts that were located in the towns and cities. They attended regularly at Assizes.
Written pleadings were not a feature of the early Courts. The entire process was an oral one, although written pleadings did become an important part of the court process. A misdrawn pleading could result is a dismissed case for want of form.
That this model continued through into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is quite understandable. The technology simply was not available to conduct a hearing in any other way. The advent of the printing press presented a means by which legal information could be accurately recorded, standardized and duplicated but this had little impact upon the way in which Court cases proceeded, although, as has been observed, printed law gradually achieved a level of acceptance whereby it became sufficiently authoritative to be relied upon by Judges as a source of law.
Although significant procedural changes came about with the merging of the Courts of Common Law and Equity perhaps the first technological innovation arose as a result of the use of the typewriter, and carefully crafted copperplate manuscript pleadings gave way to typewritten ones. Other technological innovations became a part of the Court system. The telephone as a means of communication between Court and participants became routine. To the dismay of many judges innovations such as the photocopier allowed for the presentation of large amounts of information and so the means of information transmission began to improve and increase. Despite the occasional incident of resistance to the use of a new technology it is doubtful that its introduction was opposed on the basis that it would result in fundamental or do substantial damage to the Rule of Law.
Rather, I would suggest, the acceptance of technologies such as evidence of tape recordings and closed circuit TV, evidence of tape recorded or video recorded evidential statements, the use of sound recording for the purposes of creating the Court record have all been accepted with little resistance. Perhaps this is because some of the apparent fundamental aspects of the court hearing have remained intact – the oral hearing, the gathering together of all the parties and witnesses in the one place in a Court – a word that echoes the Royal origins of the process – remain.
Yet the basic method of conducting a case – bringing information before the Court so that the fact finder may process that information and in turn reverse the flow of information back to the parties – remains.
Symbols, Imagery and the Culture of Law
But around the very basic process of information exchange a certain mystique, ritualism and symbolism has developed. This has to do with the mythologizing of the legal process – elevating it in importance as an aspect of the Rule of Law. But these mystical elements must give way to new and different ways of achieving the outcomes that the legal process seeks. As the legal process has done in the past, the adoption and use of new technologies may achieve this and at the same time maintain and enhance its relevance in the hearts and minds of the citizenry.
The Symbols of Justice
Societies have sought to define the nebulous virtue of justice through visual allegories and metaphors, along with libraries of books, articles, tales and parables written and told to imbue the abstraction of justice with meaning.
The management of image in the service of power is well known in modern politics although imagery and symbolism has played a part in depicting and representing power structures, along with other abstract ideas, throughout history. Much of this symbolism is represented in art, objects or architecture. The law is no stranger the use of symbols and other representations to enhance or solidify its importance in society.
In Ancient Greece Themis – a Titaness – is described as “[the Lady] of good counsel”, and is the personification of divine order, fairness, law, natural law, and custom. Her symbols are the Scales of Justice, tools used to remain balanced and pragmatic. Themis means “divine law” rather than human ordinance, literally “that which is put in place”, from the Greek verb títhēmi (τίθημι), meaning “to put”. Her Roman equivalent was Iustitia.
Themis is perhaps the most recognizable symbol of justice and her statue may be found in many Court locations, perhaps the most recognizable to those of the Anglo-American tradition as the figure on the dome of the Old Bailey. She is referred to as Lady Justice and is often portrayed not only with scales but also with a blindfold, a further symbol within a symbol, representing the impartiality and objectivity of justice. Her scales represent weighing competing arguments or propositions and the sword is the sword of power and punishment. In some representations a snake appears under her foot, representing the overcoming of evil as well as, latterly, a book representing a source of law.
In earlier imagery she was not seen as standing alone but was flanked by Temperance, Prudence, Fortitude and other classical virtues. With her sisters relegated to antiquity, however, justice has come to be treated as a self-sufficient ideal, a secularized cardinal virtue for the moderns.
She is the totem onto which Western societies have projected their concerns about power and legitimacy. Her omnipresence is a visual reminder of John Rawls’s famous dictum that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’.
This image is perhaps the most recognizable of justice and its association with Court.
The courthouse as a central location for the administration of justice is frequently portrayed as an imposing structure, often harking back to classical elements. Examples may be found in the United States Supreme Court Building or the imposing, almost overpowering façade of the Royal Courts of Justice in London or the Palais de Justice in Paris.
The architecture of courthouses frequently incorporates pillars or similar architectural motifs. The pillars represent strength and sustainability, representing a reliable justice system.
Frequently the neoclassical architectural style that characterizes the United States Supreme Court along with many other Courthouses in the United States reflects the desire of the State to connect with a mythical past or ideal of justice embodied by Graeco-Roman temples or other famous buildings of antiquity. Indeed, court construction at a national, regional or transnational level is deeply self-conscious, engaged with history by seeking to embrace and link to traditions and often culture.
On the other hand because the imagery of justice has been deployed to sanction power, the handful of images that suggest that justice might sometimes require defying the law are powerful and haunting. The South African Constitutional Court has been built on the site of an apartheid-era prison, and preserves the marks of decades of abuse perpetrated within its confines.
The murals that adorn the Mexican Supreme Court provide equally visceral reminders of egregious and arbitrary uses of state power. Rafael Cauduro’s arresting images break with the usual piety of courthouse art in which justice is represented as the guiding light of a benevolent state, and instead depict acts of torture, rape and mass murder carried out by agents of the State.”
These representations of justice within the context of a Courthouse – location in the case of South Africa – murals in the case of Mexico – stand out as reminders of the importance of justice in opposition to the arbitrary use of repressive State power and the important function performed by the Rule of Law to protect the rights and dignity of citizens.
However, more recently we witness the grand architecture of courts being eschewed in favor of multipurpose ‘law enforcement centers’ that fulfill a range of bureaucratic functions. The contrast between the visual grandeur of traditional courts and the invisibility of new forms of adjudication underlines the fact that the latter are much less accessible to the public even though they ‘decide the rights and obligations of hundreds of thousands of individuals’.
Even in the case of administrative hearings that as a practical matter, everyone has the “right” to attend’, the proceedings are physically difficult to locate. Perhaps, given the developments in modern Courthouse design, our representation of justice as of the imposing, powerful, symmetrical and even handed is itself being mythologized.
Courtroom ritual fulfils a number of functions. What to many may seem to be a somewhat unusual sequence of bows when a Judge enters the courtroom is a mark of mutual respect for the participants in the process. The somewhat arcane language – “May it please your Honour” – is indicative of respectfulness and for some provides a path in to the development of an argument.
If anything it is in the rituals of the Court that we see the greatest practicality of the process. In essence the Court provides a forum for competing arguments. Despite the drama and raised voices that one sees in American courtroom TV shows, the argument that is carried out in Court is very restrained and conducted, for the main, rationally and within a very constrained framework. Raised voices are not tolerated. Personal opinions are eschewed in favour of the advancement of a proposition. “I think” is replaced with “I submit”.
Yet in many respects this means of presentation of an argument in itself represents a move towards a comfort zone. True, the development of advocacy has taken place over a number of years and has reached a point where there seems little room for innovation. But at the same time it represents an aspect of comfort with process that itself obstructs any suggestion that there may be a better or more effective way of presenting a proposition. For this reason, despite the obvious advantages of modern advocacy allowing a number of technology enhanced forms of presentation, I consider Courtroom ritual to be an aspect of cultural impediments to change.
The Imagery of Justice
The symbols, imagery and architectural styles are part and parcel of the representations that to an extent mythologize justice to the point where those symbols become cultural imperatives for the way in which the system is required and expected to operate. Within many Courthouses are great halls, entry porticos, in some cases doors engraved with symbols, conspicuous images of national identity such as coats of arms or other forms of constitutional iconography representing or portraying legitimacy of what takes place within the temple-like structure.
The Courtroom or courtrooms themselves and their location in the building often structurally or by way of positioning represent the hierarchical nature of the law and indeed the legal establishment. Many Courthouses have a large main Courtroom, often used for ceremonial purposes, surrounded by a number of smaller Courtrooms. Within these ceremonial courtrooms, often replete with large paintings depicting Jurists or Heads of Bench, the rituals and cultural underpinning of the law are enhanced. On ceremonial occasions in New Zealand Queens Counsel are seated in order or appointment and are called upon in that order for no other purpose than to recognize their presence – a process that is mystifying to members of the public who are not members of the legal “priesthood.”
The Courtroom itself contains its own hierarchies with a raised bench, counsel’s table – prosecution or Crown at the front, defence behind for no other reason, like many legal cultural practices, than that is the way that it has always been – and the public behind a bar beyond which only certain persons may pass.
In appellate Courtrooms the design is usually very symmetrical with equally symmetrical seating for the Judges, the President or the Chief Justice in the centre. Once again the quaint and polite rituals take place. Before the Judges are seated and before they bow to those in the Court they bow to each other.
Apart from the central seat, the seating of the Judges represents the egalitarian nature of the Judges who occupy the same bench, although that said in most of the top appellate courts the judges sit from the centre based on their seniority. Seniority is another quaint aspect of the imagery of legal culture.
The layout of the Courtroom is reminiscent of a place of worship – the Bench is in the place of the altar and often behind it is a form of iconography be it a flag or other national symbol like a coat of arms. The area before the Bar where counsel and other officers of the Court may take their place is akin to the sanctuary – an area reserved for the priesthood – and the public gallery seating is similar to the pews in a church.
The impact of the imagery of justice and especially the Courthouse is not restricted to those attending. The images of Court buildings appears countless times in newspapers, television and online in any number of places owing to an intense focus on Court hearings from national media coverage. This use of the imagery of justice enhances the perceived power of the Court, adding to the cultural significance of the legal process.
At the same time the top appellate Courthouses perpetuate the imagery and representations of justice by being not only symbolic of government authority but, as they become empty of the business of judging and evolve into museums for school children and destinations for tourists, they are becoming themselves symbols for courts.
The Majesty of the Law
So far I have demonstrated how the symbolism of the law has become part of the cultural heritage of those involved in its practice and administration. To interfere with the symbols and images of the law would at best be culturally uncomfortable and at worst be seen as rending the fabric of the Rule of Law. And in many respects these elements underpin the issue of “the majesty of the law” as an aspect of the Rule of Law and which is used as a reason for applying the brakes to technological change.
Andrew Langdon as Chairman of the Bar in 2016 in his inaugural address made reference to the “majesty of the Court.
“Most of us – lawyers or not – instinctively understand the solemnity or as it is sometime put, the “majesty” of the law. The historic prominence of a court building in the municipal setting demonstrates that our ancestors understood it also. Whereas no one wants court users to be overborne or intimidated, neither will it be helpful if respect for those who administer the law is diminished by the very fact that those who come before the Court are only in the virtual presence, rather than the actual presence of judicial authority.”
Those who see the law and its administration as “majestic” and remote hearings as being an erosion of the “majesty of the law” need to give careful consideration to the purpose of the legal process. At the moment the court system is hard to understand, hard to access, marginalising for many and reserved for the few who can afford it. Coupled with that, it retains elements of kinetic presence and orality that have been part and parcel of the system since the Middle Ages.
One must add to this the fact that many of our Court buildings are anything but majestic, apart from the occasional imposing temples such as the United States Supreme Court building in Washington DC or the Supreme Court building in Wellington, New Zealand. By and large our Court buildings are shabby and run down. As Professor Susskind says “To celebrate our court buildings again runs the risk of lapsing into romantic transcendentalism.”
Indeed, I would suggest that it is not “majesty” itself that is the fundamental value. It is not an intrinsic good, important for its own sake. Rather than a “majestic” system we want a system that is authoritative, respected and supportive of the principles of justice to which I have already referred.
Furthermore the system should be relevant and not detached from the mainstream lives of citizens. It should not be intimidating and should reflect modern standards and understandings. The court system should not exist as a majestic rarely used physical system, little understood and at the periphery of the lives of citizens. It should be effective, meaningful, authoritative, relevant, respected and understood as part of the mainstream of a society under the Rule of Law.
The use of cameras in Court have assisted in public education and have increased public awareness of the way in which the Court process operates and have not derogated from the solemnity of the Court as an institution nor its processes. The UK Supreme Court live streams its hearings and a similar proposal is in train for the New Zealand Supreme Court. Some Federal Appeal Courts in the US also live stream. The US Supreme Court needs to rethink its attitude to cameras in court.
Remote hearings will increase the necessary legitimacy to and confidence in the legal process by providing an effective additional means to access the justice system. The alternative is for litigants to migrate to other forms of private sector dispute resolution, simple because the State is failing in its duty to its citizens
Fundamental to the Rule of Law is an effective State provided mechanism for the resolution of disputes. An effective, popular, authoritative and respected Court system that embraces new communications technology to further its purpose should underpin and help maintain the Rule of Law.
The Comfort Zone
It is perhaps within the realm of cultural comfort that the innate conservatism of many lawyers lies. The mantra goes “this is the way that we have done things in the past and it has worked and there is no need to change.” This mantra, of course, ignores the fact that law and particularly the legal culture associated with it does change albeit slowly and at times imperceptibly. In essence this mantra calls upon the traditions of law as a validation for continuing past practices. But tradition itself cannot act as a justification unless there is some rational basis for its continuation. And the problem with tradition is that is is constantly facing the winds of change and the dynamic of the human condition.
I have already commented on the role of the printing press – the first information technology – and its dynamic impact on legal culture. The shift from an understanding of the underlying communicative qualities of the printing press, although recognized by some legislators such as Thomas Cromwell and by those who wished to advance a particular view of the law such as Sir Edward Coke, to a positive cultural shift in the recognition of the fact that the fixity of print and its incorporation in a book enabled the certainty that the law demanded along with its authoritativeness took some 284 years from the publication of Littleton’s Tenures in 1481 to the dictum of Lord Camden in Entick v Carrington.
There were other dynamics in the law. The development of the adversarial criminal trial with counsel playing a part provides an example. The evolution of the criminal trial from a lawyer free to a lawyer dominated model and the slow recognition that there was a taxonomy of types of evidence developed over a period of a century from the 1690’s when counsel were permitted in Treason trials to the 1730’s when judges allowed counsel to cross-examine witnesses to the greater involvement of counsel in arguing points of law by the 1780’s. It may be surprising to some that the criminal trial process is a relative novelty when one considers the reach and scope of legal history.
There are other examples of dynamic change in the law and in legal processes. In my years of practice I have seen the Criminal Justice Act 1954, the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and the Sentencing Act 2002 along with the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 all of which introduced significant changes in criminal procedure. These were not opposed or decried because they challenged “the way we have always done things”.
There have been other examples of the dynamic in legal culture. One example may be seen in the abandonment in New Zealand of the need to wear wigs and gowns in the Senior Courts. Wigs and gowns are now retained only for ceremonial occasions, vested as they are with calls upon professional traditions. Yet the move for change was met with considerable protest, and is still decried by some traditionalists. Now only a black gown is worn in the Senior Courts and in the District Court for criminal jury trials.
The dynamic has reached the Judiciary. Imperceptibly and certainly without wide debate, although I imagine there were some terse exchanges in Senior Court common rooms, the formal ceremonial red robes of Her Majesty’s Judges has given way to a black gown with a motif panel upon it and the full bottomed wig, harking back to Restoration days, has been consigned to the cupboard.
Yet I suggest that what I call cultural comfort or continuing to do things in a particular way because that is the way that they have been done underpins much of the resistance to procedural change in the way in which cases are presented in Court. I further suggest that the elements of the Rule of Law that allow for transparency and public performance do not require the symbolic elements of the quasi-religious temples of justice nor can their continued use to the exclusion of other alternative means of delivering justice be justified on what is a self-perpetuating representation and imagery of what the Rule of Law is imagined to be.
How Culture Changes With Technology
In this section I shall argue that new technologies may act as drivers or agents of change in behaviour, values and culture. I shall propose that the pace of change has accelerated and indeed in terms of communications technologies, the digital revolution has ushered in a new communications paradigm – the Digital Paradigm.
I have suggested elsewhere that digital communications systems have resulted in a paradigm shift in the way in which we communicate and in our responses to and expectations of information. This arises from the significant properties that digital communications systems bring to bear and how they enable the differing views that we have of the communication of information.
Changes in Behaviour
Marshall McLuhan’s aphorism “we shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us” pithily sums up the way in which our inventions and tools affect behaviour. Once the tool becomes a part of what we do it changes how we do it and in the long term may have an impact upon other aspects of our lives and ultimately our expectations and values.
In the past there has been a gradual progression of new communications media. The printing press was the first information technology and until the mechanisation of print was introduced, there were no major changes in the way in which the technology operated. The types of content that print produced expanded but the real “reach” of print became possible with industrial printing and much larger print runs than were possible with the hand operated press. The technology and its particular underlying properties, however, remained the same.
The next step on the communications media progression was the introduction of telegraph – the long distance transmission of text or symbols without the physical exchange of an object bearing the message. Semaphore, beacons and reflected light signals (heliograph) are forms of telegraphy but it was the use of electricity that enabled the development of telegraphy in the early nineteenth century as the next development in communications technologies. Telegraphy was followed by the telephone – another one to one technology that enabled communication by voice – wireless telegraphy in the 1880’s and from this communications innovation came radio and television in relatively rapid succession.
The time lapses between the introduction of these various technologies reduced considerably and the pace of change accelerated. But each technology was a discrete development. In addition, transmission of information required significant investment in infrastructure so that the deployment of capital intensive communications technologies such as radio or television was only possible by means of centralised organisations. In addition, there was no real convergence of technologies although television could be considered a form of radio with pictures. But it certainly became more than that.
Each of these communications technologies brought to the table a new set of characteristics or properties that modified those of earlier technologies or introduced new ones. The effect of this was that the expectations and behaviours surrounding information communication changed. Furthermore, the development of these various technologies meant that the range of means by which information could be acquired increased as well. But in terms of information flows, communication was virtually one way – from the originator of the information to the audience. Unless one was a member of a live radio or TV audience, participation in information flows and in the creations of information in response to that received was nil.
This has all changed with the development of the Internet and the various communications protocols that are “bolted” on to it. Effectively what has happened has been the convergence of communications technologies so that users may send and receive information from the one place, virtually at the same time in a seamless fashion.
I suggest that the new communications technologies that have become available on the mass market for mass consumption have resulted in changes in behaviour.
As behaviours change their validity becomes accepted as a norm and as an acceptable aspect of life. For many private conversations in a private setting via mobile phone are perfectly acceptable. There is an expectation that there will be an element of privacy accorded to such communications.
Indeed the mobile phone has drastically altered behaviour by virtue of the fact that it makes subscribers available 24/7. No longer are business communications restricted to the office setting and although this is seen as an added pressure of business it is accepted as a part of life in the Digital Paradigm.
The smart phone provides a smorgasbord of communications options in addition to voice communication. It enables text messaging, video messaging, access to the Internet and communication – both voice and video – by a number of apps that have been made available by third party developers.
Changes in Assumptions about Information
Understanding the medium and the way it governs and moderates information activities allows us to understand the impact of the digital communications technologies – a convergence of everything that has gone before and the way in which it redefines the use of information and the way we access it, process it, use it, respond to it and our expectations of it and its availability.
In some respects the paradigm shift can be seen in an inter-generational context. Mark Prensky, an American educator, spoke of the issues confronting education in the digital paradigm. He suggested that there was a growing culture of people who had grown up knowing nothing but the Internet, digital devices and seeking out information on-line. This group he called “Digital Natives” – those born after 1990. He contrasted this class with “Digital Immigrants” – those who had developed the information seeking and uses before the advent of the Internet. Digital Immigrants used digital communications systems but their thought processes were not as committed to them as Digital Natives. Although they could speak the same language as the Digital Natives, they had a different accent that derived from an earlier information paradigm.
Digital Immigrants have an approach to information that is based upon sequential thinking, single tasking and limited resources to enable communication, all underpinned by the fixity of text. For the Digital Immigrant text represents finality. A book is not to be reworked, and the authority of a text depends upon its finality. Information is presented within textual constraints that originate in the Print Paradigm.
Digital Natives inhabit a different information space. Everything is “multi” – multi-resource, multi-media, multi-tasking, parallel thinking. Information for the Digital Native may in its first instantiation be text but it lacks the fixity of text, relying rather on the dynamic, fluid, shifting qualities of the digital environment. Text does not mean finality. Text is malleable, copyable, moveable and text, like all other forms of information in the digital space, is there to be shared.
In the final analysis, the fundamental differences between Digital Immigrants and Digital Natives can be reduced to one fundamental proposition – it’s all about how we process information. For Digital Natives the information resources are almost without limitation and the Digital Native mind shifts effortlessly between text, web-page hypertext links, YouTube clips, Facebook walls, Flikr and Tumblr, the terse, abbreviated tweet or text message and all of it not on a desktop or a laptop but a handheld smartphone.
Expectations of information
Along with intergenerational changes in assumptions about information, our expectations of information change as well and many of those expectations are based upon assumptions which are largely developed and perpetuated by digital natives.
One only has to consider the use of the phrase “for further information go to www…….” to understand that the information that has been presented is often not the full story, that there is another source for that information, that there is a greater volume of detail of information about the topic at that source and finally that everyone is going to be able to access that source. The source, of course, is Internet-based and so the expectation is that detailed information can be found on the Internet. The assumption that drives that expectation is that everyone has access to the Internet and despite the fact that Internet uptake in New Zealand is high we know that is not the case.
Another aspect of information expectation is that of immediacy. Exponential dissemination couple with searchability and retrievability make information almost instantly available. The ability that large segments of the population have to be able to fact-check on the spot means that we are reluctant to wait for the 6 O’clock news or the next edition of the newspaper. Indeed, with online versions of newspapers readily available the presence of the newspaper on the breakfast table has become redundant and is replaced by the iPad with access not to one newspaper but to thousands.
Our expectations of information are shaped, as McLuhan observed, by the very underlying qualities of the technology that we fail to understand or recognize because we are fascinated by and are continually seeking out content.
Information Expectations and the Courts in Covid 19
The Covid 19 crisis in New Zealand and indeed in many other countries forced Courts to examine how they communicated at a time of extreme social distancing and lockdown which restricted travel and availability of counsel and participants in Court proceedings. Audio Visual Link (AVL) appearances by prisoners in custodial remand had become routine following the introduction of the Courts (Remote Participation) Act 2010.
The technology that was available for AVL did not allow for multi-party participation and the Ministry of Justice had to move swiftly to find some tool that could allow for virtual appearances. It was necessary to scale back the types of cases that could be heard during the most extreme phase of lockdown but the use of conferencing software enabled multi-party participation in those cases that were heard.
As the restrictions have eased the level of personal participation in Court proceedings has increased. It is still possible, and for many lawyers preferable, to appear remotely where that is appropriate.
A consideration of the information expectations that arose as a result of the use of remote technology for Court appearances demonstrate how information expectations morph into behavioural patterns.
- That it could be done in the first place
- That, apart from some initial technical difficulties, it provided workable solution
- That it enabled a court appearance without the necessity for travel to and from Court
- That it enabled a number of court appearances in sequence and by appointment that might have taken a considerable amount of travel time to accomplish were they to have been in person
- That in between virtual or remote appearances there were opportunities to attend to other work thus maximizing productive time
- Importantly that a remote appearance did not do violence to the Court process or to other aspects of the Rule of Law
The wider use of remote technology developed within an existing legal and statutory framework that gave it legitimacy but was accelerated and indeed proven effective by a crisis.
Although this cannot be said to be a perfect means for introducing technological change it was necessary for the continuing function of the Courts. The duration of the lockdown and Alert Levels in New Zealand have not allowed for the use of remote technologies to become firmly embedded in the process and it is a matter of regret for some that the Heads of Bench prefer a move back to “in person” appearances when the requirements of Alert Level allow it.
This challenges the expectations that many lawyers have developed around the use and effectiveness of remote court technologies and will be seen as many as a retrograde step that ignores the way in which the effective communication of information in the Court process may develop, notwithstanding statutory provisions to the contrary.
Final Thoughts on Cultural Change
In the conclusion to my book Collisions in the Digital Paradigm I made the following observations.
“Digital information systems have revolutionised our approaches to information in all its aspects. This revolution has ushered in a paradigmatic change in the way in which we communicate and deal with information. This has had an impact upon law and upon lawyers.
Legislators, wedded to a process that is by its very nature deliberate and deliberative, struggle to make rules that are applicable for the foreseeable future. The problem with that this process is that it collides with continuing disruptive change and a society the dynamic of which is in a continuing state of flux as the next new “new thing” comes along. And change is incredibly fast. Facebook was founded in 2004. [Sixteen] years later it has become almost the “establishment” of social media platforms.
Judges develop rules on a case by case basis while, on occasion, developing broad principles applicable to certain type of activity. There are a number of limitations to the judicial process in developing rules for a rapidly developing paradigm. One is that cases are decided upon the evidence that is available – within the parameters of the pleadings, issues and argument. And on occasion that evidence may be limited, incomplete or misunderstood. Another limitation lies in the judicial process and the care that must be employed in ensuring that the examples and illustrations used in judicial reasoning are applicable and appropriate. A third lies in the fact that cases decided about one technology may not be applicable to another. And then there is the problem of too much information which may obstruct the development of principle based precedent.
For lawyers, for whom information rather than time is stock-in-trade, the new paradigm has been challenging. But on the positive side lawyers have available more information, more means of communicating more quickly, more opportunities to enhance workflow methods, to automate the standard and repetitive tasks so that they may focus upon the areas of work that require the delicate, specialist, case specific approaches to client problems, to obtain information from a myriad of alternative sources and to communicate that information along the various flow paths to clients, to colleagues and to courts as the case may be. And one of the stunning successes that has been achieved by lawyers and rule makers in the law and technology field has been the development of e-discovery rules. Technology has not only driven change. It has, in some jurisdictions, been the catalyst for innovative approaches to fundamental discovery principles.
Technology is not the master. It is a servant. But as the printing press was described as an agent of change in the early-modern period, so the development of information technologies based on digital systems are agents of change. I suggest that the agency is perhaps more powerful than that of the printing press, simply because the qualities that underlie digital systems and that acts as enablers of behaviour are more powerful than those of print.
The pervasive way in which digital technologies have inserted themselves into our lives means that their influence, although obvious in some contexts, will be more nuanced in others. The influence of technology on behavioural norms and the values that accompany new behaviours and that underpin law is a continuing story and will be for some time. The long-term impact of the Digital Paradigm may be much wider than we may think at present.
When I looked at the changes that took place when lawyers encountered the first information technology – the printing press – I noted that change was gradual, incremental and slowly progressive, marked by co-existence with earlier information systems. Certainly co-existence of technologies is still a reality. As I looked out over my Law and IT class, among the host of laptops were students still employing scribal note-taking techniques that were used before the advent of print.
But unlike the early-modern period the pace of change in the new millennium has been infinitely faster and many lawyers have adopted and deployed new technologies with enthusiasm. These practitioners are probably the exception for lawyers and judges are not renowned for technological enthusiasm and technology driven innovation.
But if law and rule making in the digital paradigm is going to develop properly – at both the legislative and judicial level – there must be a proper understanding not only of what the technology can do but how it does it and the way in which the properties of digital technologies impact upon our pre-conceived understanding of information and its use. The message is in the medium and it is the medium – the technology – that must be understood. And care must be taken not to obstruct the potential and the opportunities that the technology may make available for society.
As with an understanding of technology so a recognition of the benefits that technology may bring to the table not only of substantive law but of the Rule of Law itself. Perhaps one of the most encouraging developments in the law and technology field is that of the moves towards on-line systems to enable citizens to seek remedies to which they may not otherwise have available as a result of cost, location or a lack of understanding. The development of on-line dispute resolution using technology – be it by means of private arbitration or mediation or by the provision of on-line courts by the State – may well revolutionise our understanding of access to justice and become the high point of technology use in the law.”
Recognising Cultural Artifacts.
The development of remote working within Court was, as I have observed, born out of necessity although it was foreshadowed as long ago as 2010. As I have demonstrated in this paper, many of the important and significant aspects of the Court within the legal structure do not depend upon imagery and symbols, upon building and icons, upon physical presence and performance. These are cultural artifacts that are unnecessary to the proper performance of the Court as a manifestation of an ordered society under the Rule of Law
In saying this I do not understate the vital importance of the function of the Court in society rather than as a symbol. The Court must continue to be seen as a place of resort for citizens – the alternative to the rule of the mob or the rule of the vigilante. In many respects the Rule of Law survives, although as we have seen in recent riots around the world the veneer of civilized behaviour is thin, because the alternative is too awful to contemplate. Yet it must be a matter of concern that there are occasions when mass behaviour renders the Rule of Law, adherence to the law and its enforcement powerless – an outcome which although rejected by politicians is, by their inaction, condoned.
The Rule of Law, in addition to those matters identified by the Chief Justice, requires acceptance. Acceptance is demonstrated by a recognition that it is the Court that will achieve adherence to the law by ensuring just processes and outcomes. Acceptance is critical, as is the case with all systems of authority, lest it become a tyranny. And in doing so the Court must employ systems that are apposite, understandable and relevant. For the new generation of Digital Natives, the rejection by the Justice System of means of communication and information sharing that are part and parcel of their paradigm will render that system quaint, old fashioned, out of date and irrelevant to their needs and expectations of how an information sharing system should work.
In saying this I do not for one moment propose nor indeed suggest that the justice system is perfect. It is, after all, a human construct, despite all the mythology, iconography, tradition and symbolism. I am not one of those transcendentalists who set their sights on an idealized concept of a just court service.
Rather I consider Voltaire’s observation that “the best is the enemy of the good” – what Professor Susskind refers to as Voltaire’s Riposte – as applicable to the way that we develop Court processes. Susskind uses Voltaire’s Riposte in the context of online courts. I shall apply it to remote court hearings. Although a remote appearances may have some drawbacks, they will amount to an improvement on a system that struggles to properly schedule and dispose of cases in a manner that is suitable to participants. Remote working means that there may be participation without the attendant logistics of attending a centrally located building
Remote working will also provide a satisfactory means by which there will be better access to the services that the Court provides and that presently require the disincentive of personal appearance with all its attendant difficulties.
The Courts can be improved and it is conceded that remote working is not going to make our Court system the best. But it will enhance the Court system by making it better than it is at the moment, thus maintaining what is good but recognizing that the best is unattainable. Consistent with Voltaire’s Riposte remote working opens a new way of working which must be better than the old.
In this paper I have advocated the use of technology in the Courts to provide an alternative way of allowing appearances at Court. I have not gone so far as to advocate an Online Court. That is for the future.
Remote working is authorized by statute and the technology for it is available. It conforms with some of the fundamental procedural requirements that underpin our perceptions of the Rule of Law.
I have been critical of the support for maintaining present Court practices to the exclusion of alternatives. I make no apology for that stance. I fail to see how appeals to tradition and a reliance upon a form of cultural mythology about the “majesty of the law” can exclude the use of systems that demonstrably enhance the way that the law can work and be effective, can be meaningful and can be relevant.
I do not suggest for one moment that remote working should be used for criminal jury trials. There is limited provision for its use in Judge Alone criminal trials. There will be other processes where it will not be useful or apposite. But those occasional circumstances should not dictate that remote working has absolutely no place in the Court system.
Rather I advocate that it is one of the smorgasbord of technological communications tools that is available for a system that depends upon the effective communication of information.
 Dame Helen Winkelmann “A Framework for the future; Technology and the Rule of Law”, delivered to the Australasian Supreme and Federal Court Judges’ Conference in Canberra on 20 January 2020
 Dame Helen Winkelmann ““Bringing the Defendant Back into the Room” Criminal Bar Association Keynote Address 3 August 2019 https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/speechpapers/Keynote-speech-Annual-CBA.pdf (last accessed 11 June 2020)
 Richard Susskind Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) p. 194.
 The audio is still available from the website of the 9th Circuit http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/media/2017/02/07/17-35105.mp3 (last accessed 15 March 2017)
 Richard Susskind Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) p. 203
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbqHG1m4alE&list=PLNaT-ciUkjcf5ii_CSGP8BleRpTOiVkkv (last accessed 5 June 2020)
 Given that historically clerics comprised a large part of what could be considered the medieval legal profession, some might think that apart from secularization, not a lot has changed.
 Lambie and Hyland “The Opportunity of a Lifetime”  NZLJ at 223.
 Professor Richard Susskind Evidence before the House of Lords Constitutional Committee Inquiry into the Constitutional Implications of COVID 19 3 June 2020 reported in Legal Futures 4 June 2020 https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/remote-hearings-can-deal-with-credibility-issues (last accessed 5 June 2020
Giving evidence before the House of Lords Constitutional Committee, Professor Richard Susskind observed that people should not presume that remote hearings cannot be used for cases where the credibility of witnesses is at stake. He stated that lawyers from around the world reported that a full-screen view of a witness brought them closer to the “whites of their eyes” than being in the courtroom. The difference between looking at someone “the size of a postage stamp” and “filling the entire screen” was “manifest”.
“What is coming through, and this is a global experience, is that many attorneys from the United States and around the world are reporting that, actually, they find video remarkably effective and they can get nearer to the whites of their eyes than in the courtroom.
“I don’t think we should make assumptions – clearly we need systematic data on this – that if there are questions of credibility, there is no way this can achieved through a video hearing.”
“As a generality across the world, video systems seemed to have worked quite well with large, complex commercial cases. The judge will have the discretion to decide which hearing mechanism is appropriate.”
“But I do find it fascinating from the feedback that people are expressing surprise that from the video hearing you can get a real sense of the person’s credibility and their demeanour, by looking at them on quite a high definition screen where the video is quite close to their face.”
 For a discussion of the nature of the confrontation right and the issues of presence see David Harvey Collisios in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rulemaking in the Internet Age (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017) p, 213 – 214. I argue that our view of the “confrontation right” is based on faulty premises about its historical background. This erroneous foundation has permeated our thinking about the importance of the confrontation right to the point where, in New Zealand the presence of an accused and witnesses is statutorily enshrined both in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (s. 25(e) )and in the Evidence Act 2006.(s. 83(1)).
 Ian Lambie and Olivia Hyland “The Opportunity of a Lifetime”  NZLJ 220 and Ian Lambie and Olivia Hyland “I am more than a piece of paper”  NZLJ 297.
 Andrew Langdon Inaugural Address 14 December 2016 Middle Temple Hall http://www.barristermagazine.com/inaugural-address-by-andrew-langdon-qc-chairman-of-the-bar-2017-delivered-in-middle-temple-hall-london-on-14-december-2016/ (last accessed 5 June 2020)
 Professor Richard Susskind Evidence before the House of Lords Constitutional Committee Inquiry into the Constitutional Implications of COVID 19 3 June 2020
 A proposition put by Andrew Langdon QC in his Inaugural Address
 See in particular Robert Fisher QC “The Demeanour Fallacy”  NZ Law Review 575 at 582. See also Chris Gallavin “Demeanour Evidence as the backbone of the adversarial process” Lawtalk Issue 834 14 March 2014 http://www.lawsociety.org.nz/lawtalk/issue-837/demeanour-evidence-as-the-backbone-of-the-adversarial-process (last accessed 20 June 2014); Professor Ian R Coyle “How Do Decision Makers Decide When Witnesses Are Telling The Truth And What Can Be Done To Improve Their Accuracy In Making Assessments Of Witness Credibility?” Report to the Criminal Lawyers Association of Australia and New Zealand” 3 April 2013 p. 8; On the subject of demeanour generally see Professor Coyles extensive bibliography. See also Lindsley Smith ”Juror Assessment of Veracity, Deception, and Credibility,” (2002) 4 Communication LR 45 http://commlawreview.org/Archives/v4i1/Juror%20Assessment%20of%20Veracity.pdf (last accessed 18 August 2014) See also David Harvey Collisions in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rulemaking in the Internet Age (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2019) Chapter 8 p. 211 et seq
  EWHC KB J98
 David Nelken ‘Using the Concept of Legal Culture’, (2004) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 29: I-26
 F Lederer “The Courtroom as a Stop on the Information Superhighway” (1997) 4 Aust Jnl L Reform 71.
 The smaller and more routine legal disputes were conducted in the manorial courts or before Justices of the Peace. Michael Dalton’s The Countrey Justice (Adam Islip for the Stationers, London,1614) was a handbook for the standard procedures that Dalton saw as critical to the proper running of such Courts.
 The Court of Star Chamber was a Court that did much of its business from written material rather than emphasizing the oral processes that were a feature of the Royal Courts, but Star Chamber met its demise in 1642 and the Royal Courts assumed the dominant position still with their focus primarily on oral argument.
 For a discussion of the impact of the printing press on law and legal culture see David Harvey The Law Emprynted and Englysshed: The Printing Press as an Agent of Change in Law and Legal Culture (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014)
 For a very detailed study of the management of image by the Tudors and Stuarts see Kevin Sharpe Selling the Tudor Monarchy (Yale University Press, New Haven 2009) Image Wars: Promoting Kings and Commonwealths in England 1603 – 1660 (Yale University Press, New Haven 2010) and Rebranding Rule: The Restoration and Revolution Monarchy 1660 – 1714 (Yale University Press, New Haven 2013).
 More frequently seen in representations after the introduction of the printing press.
 For a detailed discussion of the iconography and representations of justice in architecture see Resnik and Curtis Representations of Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms. (Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut 2011) Their principal thesis is that ‘the forms in which governments represent themselves provide windows into their aspirations. For further reading see David DesBaillets “Representing Canadian Justice: legal iconography and symbolism in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2018) 14 International Jnl of Law in Context 132 – 156 available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-law-in-context/article/representing-canadian-justice-legal-iconography-and-symbolism-at-the-supreme-court-of-canada/75886182BB2B238C0E79B8C61861A819/core-reader (last accessed 6 June 2020)
 The design of the New Zealand Supreme Court Building is imposing and architecturally unique, especially in its design of the Courtroom but consciously adopts motifs and styles reflecting the multi-cultural community of New Zealand. Nevertheless the motif of the pillars as the supporters of the structure of justice, together with a more localized type of entablature rather than a traditional or classical one are present in the New Zealand Supreme Court building.
 Turkuler Israel “Review: Representing Justice: Invention, controversy and rights in city-states and democratic courtrooms” (2013) 12 Contemporary Political Theory p. e.10 – e.13
 The use of powerpoint or presentation software is an example of innovation in advocacy, although one that was initially contentious – see R v Haanstra HC Wellington T1155/00, 16 November 2000; R v D CA80/04 8 December 2004; R v Harriman HC Auckland CRI-2005-004-14921, 15 December 2006; R v Tukuafu  1 NZLR 659 (CA).
The use of electronic bundles is another innovation although the protocols require an approach that is imitative of the hardcopy Eastlight folders. See Senior Courts Civil Electronic Document Protocol 2019 https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/assets/going-to-court/practice-directions/practice-notes/all-benches/scced_0.pdf (last accessed 14 June 2020).
 Resnik and Curtis Representations of Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms. (Yale University Press, New Haven Connecticut 2011) p. 339.
 Andrew Langdon QC Inaugural Address 14 December 2016 Middle Temple Hall http://www.barristermagazine.com/inaugural-address-by-andrew-langdon-qc-chairman-of-the-bar-2017-delivered-in-middle-temple-hall-london-on-14-december-2016/ (last accessed 5 June 2020
 Richard Susskind Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) p. 208.
 For a full discussion see David Harvey The Law Emprynted and Englysshed: The Printing Press as an Agent of Change in Law and Legal Culture (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014) and for the qualities of the printing press Elizabeth Eisenstein The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (1 Vol) (Cambridge university Press, Cambridge 1980) esp at chapter 2 page 43 et seq
 See John Langbein The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003)
 The argument is developed in David Harvey Collisions in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rulemaking in the Internet Age (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017) at Chapter 2. I identify a taxonomy of 13 qualities which dramatically, paradigmatically, differ digital technologies from those that have gone before. The taxonomy for these qualities suggests three major classifications based upon the nature of the qualities. These classifications I have described as “Environmental”, “Technical” and “User Associated.”
The environmental qualities relate to change and the drivers for change. They are continuing disruptive change and permissionless innovation. The technical qualities are underlying aspects of the way in which Digital Communications Technologies, and especially the Internet, work. They are delineaisation of information, information persistence or endurance, dynamic information, volume and capacity, exponential dissemination, the non-coherence of digital information and format obsolescence. The final set of the three categories of qualities – user associated qualities – involve the way in which digital technologies provide opportunities for users to locate, acquire and process information The first three qualities, which I have grouped together because they represent a continuum, perhaps are indicative of the nature of a cross-over between what could be considered technical qualities – something inherent in the technology – and qualities that are primarily user focussed. The final quality relates to the way in which the Digital Paradigm enables information creation in a multi-authorial sense. They are the availability, searchability and retrievability of information, participation and interactivity
 Marc Prensky “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants” (2001) 9 On the Horizon 1 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1074-&121&volume=9&issue=5&articleid=1532742&show=pdf ; www.marcprensky.com/…/prensky%20-%20digital%20natives,%20digital%20immigrants%20-%20part1.pdf (last accessed 23 February 2012).
For a brief introduction to the development of Prensky’s theory see Wikipedia “Digital Native” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_native (last accessed 23 February 2012).
 Ronald Collins and David Skover The Death of Discourse (Caroline Academic Press, Durham N.C. 2005) p. xix. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between fixed and digital texts see Ronald Collins and David Skover Paratexts (1992) 44 Stanford Law Review 509.
 Section 8 of the Courts (Remote Participation) Act 2010 mandates the use of AVL in criminal procedural matters where that technology is available and the participant is in custody unless a Judge or Registrar determines otherwise. However, protocols issued by the various Heads of Bench have mandated a return to the “in person” model and indeed run counter to the position mandated by statute.
 Richard Susskind Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019) p. 182 et seq.