Imitating Paper

The Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016

The purpose of the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016 is to enable and govern the use of electronic technology in court and tribunal proceedings. It is overarching. All paper based processes in existing courts and tribunals may be interpreted as allowing electronic processes.
The Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act is posited upon the concept of functional equivalence – a theory which gives legal recognition to recording systems and their validation in a format other than paper. The Act in many respects reflects the principles that appear in the Electronic Transactions Act 2002 which did not apply to the Court system.
A central focus of the legislation is upon what is called a permitted document. The term “permitted document” means a document, including its associated process, in electronic form that is made by, or for use in, a court or tribunal. The purpose of the legislation is to facilitate the use of permitted documents in court and tribunal proceedings and allow existing references in enactments to documents to include permitted documents.
Not all documents are permitted documents and the legislation at section 4(2) lists those that do not qualify. These are:

(a) a document given on oath or by affirmation:
(b) a statutory declaration:
(c) a will, a codicil, or any other testamentary instrument:
(d) a power of attorney or an enduring power of attorney:
(e) a negotiable instrument:
(f) any notice required to be attached to any thing or left or displayed in any place:
(g) any warrant or other instrument authorising entry into premises or the search or seizure of any person or thing:
(h) any other document specified by the Governor-General by Order in Council made on the recommendation of the Minister:
(i) an item specified in any of paragraphs (a) to (h) that is required to be served by personal service.

The legislation effectively recognises that verification and authenticity of information contained in these classes of documents may only be provided by a tangible paper-based medium.
The Act does not mandate the use of electronic documents, although certain classes of persons yet to be defined in regulations may be required to use them.
The use of permitted documents requires the consent of the person using them although consent can be inferred from conduct. A person may not be compelled nor directed to use permitted documents. Thus, unless a person consents to the use of permitted documents it is paper by default.
Where there are requirements for information to be recorded, be in or be given in writing that information may be in a permitted document as long as it is readily accessible and useable for subsequent reference. This means that an electronic document must be accessible in the sense that it is not in archived or backup format and can be accessed presumably in native file format.
The legislation does recognise the dynamic nature of digital information and the reality that multiple copies may be made of a digital document that are identical to the “first” or source copy.
Where there is a requirement that multiple copies of information are to be provided, that requirement is met by providing a single electronic version of a permitted document and a requirement to provide information in a manner that complies with a paper based form met by permitted document if information is readily accessible and usable for subsequent reference.
Authentication and signature requirements provide a challenge for those used to verification of a document or its contents by a physical kinetic act such as affixing a seal or sign manual. How is that accomplished in a digital context?
Signature requirements for permitted documents are addressed in section 16 of the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016. An “electronic signature” or verification must adequately indicate the approval of the information and must be “as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the signature is required.”
Importantly, electronic verification of a document is subject to an exception when one is witnessing a document. Witnessing requirements in a permitted document are met by an “electronic signature” if

a) The e-signature complies with the requirements of section 16
b) The e-signature adequately identifies the witness and indicates that the signature or seal has been witnessed
c) The e-signature is “as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the signature is required.”

If a permitted document requires a seal, that requirement may be met by an electronic seal if

a) The seal adequately identifies the party attaching it and
b) “is as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the seal is required.”

The language echoes that dealing with electronic signatures. It is to be noted that the requirements for electronic signatures and seals refer to the issue of reliability. Section 19 of the Act sets out certain presumptions as to reliability and an electronic signature is presumed to be reliable if:

(a) the means of creating the electronic signature is linked to the signatory and to no other person; and
(b) the means of creating the electronic signature was under the control of the signatory and of no other person; and
(c) any alteration to the electronic signature made after the time of signing is detectable; and
(d) where the purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.

However, any other way of establishing reliability is not excluded and may be used.
The Act also sets out rules for the retention of permitted documents , for the dispatch and receipt of permitted documents. These provisions duplicate the provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002. The filing requirements dispense with the requirement that a document be filed in a particular office of the Court and allow for the filing of a permitted document at any place specified in the regulations. In addition the place for filing may be physical or electronic and may be centralised or located within the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal.
Some important observations need to be made.

1. Although the Act has commenced it is not operative. Section 6 requires the Governor General by Order in Council made on the recommendation of the Minister to specify the Courts, tribunals or particular jurisdictions of Courts and Tribunals to which the Act applies. As matters stand, no such Order has been made. Once proper systems are in place to handle electronic filing the necessary orders will be made.

2. Will the Act significantly change Court processes. Except for the changes to place of filing rules, things will largely remain the same. This is because the legislation is imitative of existing processes. Imitative use of technology preserves existing processes and procedures but allows the same objectives to be achieved by electronic means. On the other hand the innovative use of technology allows for the introduction of disruptive and different procedures and processes enabled by the new technologies which ultimately result in a transformative and improved outcome.

3. Thus the legislation maintains the model of the paper based court system and adds a limited form of digital communications in the form of permitted documents – an electronic equivalent of paper.

If it was the intention of the Legislature to maintain the model of the paper based court system and add a limited form of digital communications in the form of permitted documents, the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act has succeeded. But in reality the Act neither lives up to its name nor its promise. It does not, as its name might suggest, create or enable fully electronic courts or tribunals. All it allows is an electronic equivalent for paper. All the legislation does is to imitate paper.

From Theory to Practice – Software Models and Evidence for the Online Court

In the paper below I look at some of the ways in which technology may be applied to proposals for on-line Courts.

The proposals by Richard Susskind the JUSTICE paper and Lord Justice Sir Michael Briggs are based upon the availability of technical solutions to fulfil the promise inherent in the new models for resolving disputes. I emphasise that in using that phrase I envisage, as did Professor Susskind, the dispute resolution model to function within the established Court process rather than as a stand alone alternative to the Court process.

A consideration of the deployment of technology within the Court process first requires a recognition of the way in which technology can reflect or replace current processes. The Online Court proposals that have been put forward suggest significant process change but represent high level strategy. What I consider is a slightly more practical overview of some of the ways in which technology may be deployed. In addition there are issues surrounding the handling of digital evidence which will require consideration.

 

Information Governance and E-Discovery

In May of 2015 I had the pleasure and honour of sharing the stage with Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte at the IQPC 10th Anniversay Information Governance and eDiscovery Summit held at the Waldorf Hilton in London. The session was chaired by Chris Dale of the excellent and continually informative Edisclosure Information Project and addressed the Global Impact of eDiscovery and Information Governance within the context of data collection for cross border cases.

The session was allocated a generous ninety minutes of Conference time, starting shortly after 9:00 pm. This enabled the presenters to make a brief presentation on issues that appeared to be relevant to the general topic. My presentation addressed common themes present in the e-discovery regimes in the APAC region – Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong and New Zealand.

Following the presentations Chris led a discussion that covered a wide range of discovery and disclosure issues. The approach of the US Courts recently exemplified by the case of In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft (District Court SDNY M9-150/13-MJ-2814 29 August 2014 Judge Preska).

One of the common themes emerging from this discussion was that although a local court may purport to exercise “long arm” jurisdiction in the case of content located off-shore, compliance with local data disclosure requirements may come into play, rendering the disclosing party liable to possible sanctions if compliance is not forthcoming.

Another issue that we discussed was that of the need for lawyers to understand and appreciate the way in which technology is used in developing areas of law and in the ediscovery field in particular. In the United States an understanding of technology is a pre-requisite for competence to practice in some areas and as we move further and deeper into the Digital Paradigm, I consider this to be an absolute necessity. Not only lawyers. More and more cases involve aspects of technology either as the subject matter of the dispute or as an aspect of the evidence that is place before the Court. It is essential that Judges have a working knowledge of some of the more common information technologies. This is something of a contentious issue for there is a school of thought that suggests that judicial understanding of technology can be reached per medium of expert evidence. That proposition may have a limited degree of validity in the case of the subtle aspects of the workings of the technology, but should not extend to ocnstant and repetitious explanations of the general way which a packet switching network operates, or the nature of email metadata and how it operates.

The Conference was a valuable one. The sessions were extremely interesting and highly relevant, all of them presented by experts in the field. I am grateful to the organisers for inviting me and to Chris Dale for his excellent Chairmanship of our session and his insightful discussion management.

I prepared a paper for the Conference delegates and a copy is available on Scribd or may be perused here.

Technology for Better Fact Finding

This is a paper that I presented to the 14th International Criminal Law Congress in Melbourne on 11 October 2014. In brief it argues that new information technologies should be employed more widely in the Court system to enhance fact finding by juries and judges. It suggests that what are traditional means of evidence presentation, whilst still relevant, may be enhanced by technology use. In particular the paper questions whether the “confrontation right” requires physical presence and suggests that technology can allow virtual presence. It also points to new developments in 3D rendering and 3D printing which may enhance evidential integrity and improve presentation and consideration of evidence. The paper also questions whether some of the ritual aspects of the trial process enhance or impede proper and effective fact finding, or whether they have relevance to the primary function of the Court at all.

E-Discovery and Asia Legal Big Data

I had the privilege of being invited to take part in the Asia Legal Big Data Symposium held at the Conrad Hotel in Hong Kong on 29 – 30 April 2014, and to share a place on a panel which included Registrar Lung Kim Wan of the Hong Kong High Court, Senior Assistant Registrar Yeong Zee Kin from the Singapore Supreme Court and Stephen Yu from Alix Partners. The focus of the Conference was upon the imminent release of a Practice Direction for the Hong Kong Courts addressing E-Discovery. Although the present Hong Kong Rules are sufficiently wide to deal with E-Discovery in a broad sense, and more focussed approach is proposed.

The panel in which I participated dealt with existing rules and how they work in Singapore and New Zealand, and how the general shape of the Hong Kong direction may appear. Stephen Yu was able to bring valuable technical knowledge into the mix in considering some of the tools and technological solutions that may be utilised in the E-Discovery process.

The Symposium itself was an abundance of riches and as is so often the case, there were times when a difficult choice had to be made between which session to attend. Some of the sessions on data and information management within organisations were very interesting and helpful, emphasising the importance of how proper information management systems and policies can be helpful when a litigation hold is notified. Of particular interest was the way in which such policies may be used to resist spoliation allegations. A proper, principled inmjformation management policy may offer a reasonable explanation for why data is not immediately available or why it is no longer in existence.

It was also a pleasure to meet again Chris Dale from the E-Disclosure Information Project. I first met Chris in Singapore at a Conference a couple of years ago and we have kept in touch. Indeed I owe a debt to Chris for it was he who recommended my participation to the Conference organisers. Chris, as always, played a valuable part of the Hong Kong Conference, sharing his experiences and insights in the E-Discovery field and often was able to point out some of the shortcomings in the way in which E-Discovery Rules are working. One observation that he made was in the context of E-Discovery as a process.

The process starts often before litigation actually begins – when in fact it is contemplated. Parties should start considering their E-Discovery obligations at this time. The various stages of the process (reflected in the EDRM diagram – EDRM means Electronic Discovery Reference Model) continue through the the presentation of documents at Court. I think I should point out that I do not consider the E-Discovery process to be of the “tick the boxes” type of process, nor one which involves a slavish adherence to a set step by step approach. In my view the process is in the form of a journey which carries on throughout the life of the litigation and which involves a number of steps or stages together with an on-going obligation on the part of counsel to meet, confer and co-operate and a requirement by the Court by way of Case Management Conferences to ensure that discovery is reasonable and proportionate. The Court can keep a steady guiding hand on the wheel as the parties continue on the E-Discovery journey. Chris’s criticism of “E-Discovery as a process” was in the context of a slavish adherence to a step by step “plan” and I agree with that. But my view is that a process may have within it a certain flexibility. For example, a staged approach to electronic review may mean that different options become apparent as the review continues, allowing for modifications as review continues.

A copy of my paper delivered to the Symposium may be found below, along with a copy of my presentation.

 

 

Presentation

Technology and the Courts – CTC 2013 – Baltimore Day 3 – Looking Ahead

I had the great honour to join Justice Robert Torres from Guam, Judge Dory Reiling from the Netherlands and Judge Martin Gonzales from Colorado to talk about Bench and Chambers 2023 on the last days of CTC2013 (19 September 2013). The discussion came at the issue from a number of angles. Robert spoke not just about IT but also about developments in neuropsychology and the impact that this may have upon evidence giving. Dory came at the issue from the perspective of technology as a facilitator, and how it can enhance justice and access to justice. Martin considered the issue from the perspective of users of court services in all their many and varied roles. My contribution was speculative based upon the impact of IT upon justice institutions using the properties analysis that I have been developing in earlier posts. My presentation may be found here. The session page may be found here

The other session that I attended was hosted by Jim McMillan of NCSC and was a wrap-up of ideas that had been developed over the Conference. The first point was that technology had to be appropriate to the job that had to be done and had to be within a context of the work required. Importantly, and I have always been an advocate of this, Judges need to get in the forefront of the technological revolution and change must be Judge-led in that it mjust be the Judges who define the tools and the goals of Courts technology use, rather than being told by technocrats to get used to whatever system is imposed.

One idea that was put forward was a development of my suggestion in the E-Discovery session that electronic documents are dynamic. The speaker suggested that they were like Schrodingers Cat in that the document may occupy a different reality depending upon what stage it had reached. Quantum mechanics in the development of a judicial decision was an interesting concept and may  be worth some thought.

One interesting point that was made in the discussion addressed automatic redaction software which may provide an answer to the problems of case reporting where there is sensitive information or parties may not be able to be identified for legal reasons.

It was recognised that perhaps the most immediate issue that needs to be addressed is that of E-Discovery – described as the freight train heading down the track. One of the recognised features is that Courts cannot carry out the E-Discovery process. But is was also recognised, as Daniel Garrie and I emphasised, that the Courts must direct the E-Discovery process by creative use of the conference process, the use of checklists and careful judicial monitoring. Resources are limited, even for clients with deep pockets and, carrying the freight train metaphor forward, the judge must be the train driver.

Jim’s session developed these and a number of other ideas in a good interactive exchange. Valuable and though-provoking.

And so the Conference came to a close. I have never been disappointed with a Courts Technology Conference, and I find there is valuable material to take away, both from a personal and from a teaching perspective. The next CTC is in Minneapolis. DVWP, I will be there.

Technology and the Courts – CTC 2013 – Baltimore Day 2 – Judging E-Discovery Disputes

This is a paper that I prepared to provide some background for a presentation that I shared with Daniel Garrie at Courts Technology Conference 2013 in Baltimore on Wednesday 18 September 2013.

It has been the main focus of my attention during Day 2 of CTC 2013 although I have spent a fascinating morning checking out some of the software solutions demonstrated by vendors in the very large and impressive exhibitors hall. Most of the solutions deal with evidence recording and presentation, AVL systems and case management systems. What I would consider to be trial management solutions for judges seem to be absent which is something of a surprise. There was nothing on show about e-discovery although to be fair, that is of more interest to lawyers than court administrators and judges.

The paper considers aspects of E-Discovery from a judicial perspective. It argues that in the quest to resolve E-Discovery disputes between parties requires an informed and pro-active approach by judges. It suggests that the first objective should be to try and avoid a disputed E-Discovery hearing, utilising proper case management techniques based not only on the requirements of the law but an understanding of how modern technology may be applied to achieve rule-based goals. But overall, judicial involvement at whatever stage in the discovery process involves aspects of judging disputes.

The approach of this paper is largely a generic one and draws on the E-Discovery rules in England, the United States and New Zealand. When one examines these rules it is clear that some common themes become apparent. It is within the context of these themes that the discussion will take place, although from time to time examples from specific jurisdictions will be given. For example, England and New Zealand use a form of menu for counsel to assist them in approaching their discovery obligations. In England this takes the form of a questionnaire. In New Zealand the checklist is incorporated into the High Court Rules. Regardless of the name applied or where it may be located, the common theme is that of a menu approach that will serve as a foundation for an E-Discovery inquiry.

The discussion will first consider the nature of digital information and why it is that E-Discovery poses a paradigmatic difference from what could be termed “traditional” discovery. I then consider some of the ways in which “traditional” discovery is challenged by new information systems and adopts the suggestion that, from a judicial perspective, a holistic approach to the processes that lie behind E-Discovery must be adopted, starting with the obligation by organisations and businesses to have a proper Electronically Stored Information (ESI) policy and the need for a Court to be aware of that when it comes to considering issues such as information destruction. I then move to a consideration of document review and discuss the need for a new mindset on the part of lawyers and judges based on the need for consultation and co-operation between the parties and a recognition that E-Discovery must be based upon what is reasonable and proportional to the case.

I then consider the obligations of the parties within the context of this mindset and then move to an examination of the process, using the New Zealand discovery checklist as an example of the menu based approach to discovery process and obligations.

I then move to discuss the approaches to E-Discovery using technology and discuss the need for proper education in the use and abilities of technology in discovery both on the part of lawyers and the judiciary. I argue for active judicial involvement and discuss the rationale for this approach. Once again the themes of reasonableness and proportionality underpin judicial activity. I argue that judicial activity should not be restricted to the courtroom and in the context of deciding a particular case should be present throughout the entire process. Creative and effective use of E-Discovery case conferences is as important as the resolution of disputes in the courtroom. With proper case conferencing, any “in-court” discovery disputes should be of limited and focussed scope.

I then move to consider the E-Discovery process and give some examples of how judicial involvement may take place within the context of considering document retention policies, examining issues surrounding document custodians and issues surrounding keyword searching within the area of Early Case Assessment. Examples of the use of technology within these stages of the examination will be considered. I close the consideration of how judges get involved with a discussion of some of the matters that may form an agenda for a case management conference.

The preparation of this paper has been greatly aided by my co-presenter Daniel Garrie, a Senior Managing Partner at Law & Forensics, an e-Discovery, cyber security, and electronic forensic consulting firm with offices nationwide. Mr. Garrie is also General Counsel of Pulse Advisory, a venture Development firm.

Mr. Garrie has served as an Electronically Stored Information Liaison, Neutral or  Expert for the L.A. Superior Courts, 2nd Circuit, 3rd Circuit, 7th Circuit, New York Supreme Court, and Delaware Supreme Court. In 2009, the Daily Journal recognized Mr. Garrie as a “Rising Star,” and in 2011 featured Mr. Garrie as a Special Master and thought leader in E-Discovery. In addition, due to his outstanding reputation in the emerging industry of E-Discovery and computer forensics, Mr. Garrie was one of a handful of individuals appointed to the E-Discovery Special Master Pilot Program for the U.S. District Court of Western Pennsylvania  out of a national pool of candidates.

Mr. Garrie is on the editorial board of the Journal of Legal Technology and Risk Management, Journal of Law & Cyber Warfare, and Beijing Law Review.  He has published over 90 articles spanning many topics. His articles have been featured in the University of San Diego Law Review, ABA International Law Journal and Suffolk Law Review. Mr. Garrie also authored the text book E-discovery and Dispute Resolution published by Thomson Reuters in the Summer of 2013 2nd Edition and Software and the Law, fall of 2013.

Mr. Garrie is admitted to practice law in Washington, New York, and New Jersey.

I am also indebted to not inconsiderable assistance from Andrew King of E-Discovery Litigation Solutions, a litigation support firm, specialising in E-Discovery. Andrew very kindly read an earlier draft  of this paper and I am very grateful to him for his suggestions. I must also acknowledge the helpful suggestions made by Chris Dale of the E-Disclosure Information Project. Chris took time out from his very busy schedule to make some very helpful comments about the judicial stance to e-discovery, and I am grateful to him for sharing his expertise.