Paperless Lawyers, Paperless Courts

A temptation for lawyers is to use technology to mirror paper-based practices. Technology merely means that the screen becomes the functional equivalent of paper and underlying behaviours relating to information do not change. What should make the utilisation of technology different is that underlying the functional equivalent of a paper based file are all the tools and advantages that digital technologies can bring such as indexing searching on the fly annotating and so on.

Andrew Downie, a lawyer in Victoria, Australia, in February of 2014, blogged on the creation of an electronic brief – ahandy “how to” guide focusing particularly upon methods of converting documents and organising them using a computer system.

But electronic case files are not the exclusive preserve of counsel. In New Zealand there are several practice notes on the utilisation of electronic bundles of documents in court.  The Senior Courts Civil Electronic Document Protocol addresses the use of electronic documents in the Higher Courts in New Zealand. The Electronic Document Practice Note 2017 is intended to encourage and facilitate the use of electronic documents for civil cases in the Court of Appeal. The 2016 Practice Note “The Use of Electronic and Common Bundles and Electronic Casebooks in the High Court” sets out guidance about when an order should be made for a common bundle and/or casebook to be filed electronically in the High Court and the default directions that apply. It is to be read and interpreted consistently with the Senior Courts Civil Electronic Protocol.

The concept of functional equivalence is to the fore and it seems to me that one of the purposes of the practice note and the move towards electronic bundles is to save space and paper. This is consistent with the imitative approach adopted in the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016 (NZ) about which I have blogged here.

What the practice notes do is provide an electronic platform for the assembly of bundles of documents but by doing so it also enables counsel to utilise technology to enhance case presentation and argument.  None of this of course is specified in the practice notes which are designed to encourage and facilitate the use of electronic bundles the various Courts.  The fact of the matter is, however, that by virtue of the advantages bought by the technology, counsel may be creative in the way in which the electronic bundle is utilised.  One of the requirements of the electronic bundle is that all documents be scanned into OCR format.  One would think that it would be unnecessary to have such a requirement, and that rendering pdf documents searchable would almost go without saying but regrettably it needs to be emphasised.  This effectively means that the information in the document may be subject to search and manipulation in a way that would not be possible in mere image format.

The practice notes make it clear that electronic bundles will not be used in every case.  They will only be used in document intensive cases where the common bundle would be likely to exceed a certain number of pages.

In “building” in electronic bundle documents must be contained in electronic folders equivalent to the physical volumes of hard copy bundles and within those folders each separate document must be a multipage pdf document.  Each folder must be named with an appropriate description and if there is more than one volume of a particular electronic bundle the folder for that type of bundle will include subfolders for each volume.  The rules also provide for electronic bundles in document intensive criminal cases.

One of the difficulties in using electronic bundles effectively lies in the fact that the majority of advocates have been bought up in the paper based environment and find it uncomfortable or difficult to make the shift into the digital paradigm with the changes in thinking that such requires.  The concept of functional equivalence gets in the way.  One uses technology merely to mirror what one would normally do with paper rather than utilise the technology to its fullest capacity.  Often software packages will themselves create difficulties.  Some software packages make it almost impossible to move from page to page without entering a code or a key.  Other software packages allow for the utilisation of barcodes whereby documents could be selected and projected using a barcode scanner but the simple fact of the matter is that counsel don’t utilise that aspect of the technology which would save considerable time and effort in moving through document intensive cases.

The various electronic document protocols effectively replace the lever arch paper folder with a USB stick or other form of storage medium. Lawyers and judges maintain an informational distance as a result. Each participant has to locate the “document” the subject of the discussion on his or her own device. A centrally located document bundle to which every participant has access and which can be displayed in Court would expedite matters. Such a tool is available in the form of Caselines which is effectively a digital court platform.

Caselines does not require software or infrastructure. It is a cloud based solution. To connect to a Caselines bundle for a trial or hearing all that is needed is a wireless connection at the Court.

Caselines bundles may be created by the parties or by the Court. Participants in a case have access to the bundle with varying levels of credentials. There are a number of different types of functionality including the ability to make notes, mark up and, importantly, to allow counsel who is referring to a document, image, video or other piece of digital material to make that available to all the participants in the case simultaneously. This means that everyone is on the same page, literally. Caselines is now used throughout the Crown Courts in England and Wales for criminal trials. Digital is the default position. Paper is no longer used

The Digital Paradigm allows lawyers to devise their own means of employing electronic technologies in the practice of law and the Courts judges in the management and presentation of cases.  What will be interesting to see is how courts and judges will respond.

But to make that leap it is necessary to examine some fundamental premises and reasons for why it is that we conduct cases in the way that we do. I have written elsewhere that the practice of law is really an exercise in information exchange, be it by way of receiving instructions from the client, processing those, seeking an information flow from research and communicating the results of that to the client by way of advice, or by way of a case in court where information flows come from witnesses whose information is assessed for relevance and reliability and which in turn inform the decision-maker’s decision which is them communicated to the parties and often to a wider audience by means of digital publication systems or by reporting in the law reports.

In court the information flows were oral exchanges. Indeed, written pleadings were not a part of court procedure until the reign of Edward IV, and most of the cases noted in the Year Books dealt with the technicalities of pleading rather than reports of decisions on substantive points of law. The first reports that revolutionised the way in which cases were recorded were those of Edmund Plowden, first printed in 1571. But the way that cases were presented in court was largely an oral process with witnesses orally stating what they saw or did and the lawyers making their points by oral rather than written argument. Or at least that was the case in the Common Law courts. Prerogative courts such as Star Chamber and the Courts of Chancery used the written record more extensively, albeit a handwritten one.

(For a full description of Star Chamber procedures see Thomas G. Barnes “Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan – Early Stuart Star Chamber” (1962) 6 American Jnl of Legal History 221)

But despite the apparent written procedures adopted by Star Chamber and the Chancery Courts, much of the information exchange remained an oral..

The oral nature of information exchange in court over the centuries requires the physical presence of the “players” in the one place – the Courtroom. Indeed it has not been until comparatively recently – and by that I mean since I was admitted to the Bar in 1970 – that judges have countenanced and encouraged the provision of arguments in writing. These may range from the massive briefs that characterise written argument in the United States to the much smaller outline style  “skeleton arguments” in England. Indeed in some appellate jurisdictions – again predominantly in the United States – oral argument is time limited, demonstrating a declining emphasis upon oral argument in favour of documentary material. Yet despite the brevity of oral argument, physical presence is still required.

Another Form of “Presence”

Technology is changing this and there is a declining emphasis on actual physical presence following upon the introduction in New Zealand of the Courts Remote Participation Act 2010 which allows for “presence” of a participant by way of audio-visual link.(AVL) In the majority of cases in the District Court the participant “attending” by way of AVL will be a  defendant who is in custody. I haven’t yet come across the case where counsel has sought to be present by way of AVL and perhaps the custodial remand focus of the technology deployed in New Zealand Courts is responsible for that, although there is nothing in the legislation which excludes the use of Skype or Facetime. I imagine that all that is required for a lawyer and a Judge to break the ice.

The issue of physical presence is one part of the expanded use of technology in case presentation. At the moment document management technology is used in document intensive cases where scanned copies of documents are assembled and presented on screens by means of software tools. I interpolate to express wry amusement that documents are scanned into these programmes rather than using software tools which allow “document” assembly of digital documents in native file format, but perhaps that is yet to come. That is fine as far as it goes.

What about expanding the scope of the hearing so that by using “presence” technology such as AVL – or perhaps, in the future, holography –  counsel may run the case remotely. Where there is a need for text based information to be presented (what we call “documents”, retaining our paper based language despite attempts by legislators to include any information however recorded as fulfilling the definition of a “document” but why retain the use of a word which conceptually is associated with hard copy media?) that can be communicated to the court by electronic means. Witnesses can be present by AVL links. The range of information that is communicable or admissible to inform the Court’s decision could include multimedia, 3D imaging, maps or satellite shots from Google Earth or Street View. All the clumsy time consuming methods currently employed for evidence presentation could be significantly more efficient without compromising information flows or the ability of fact finders or law deciders to reach a conclusion.

Our “presence based” focus has its roots in rituals which, with modern communications technologies, can no longer be justified.

These ideas may seem to be radical – perhaps revolutionary – but the reality of the fact is that we are and will continue to be for some time in the midst of an information technology driven by continuous disruptive change. It is incumbent upon lawyers, judges and those involved in the information exchange process that underlies the activities of all lawyers to maximise and deploy these new technologies.

Advertisements

CTC 2017 – The Online Court

This year I was invited to present a paper at the National Center for State Courts biannual conference – Courts Technology Conference 2017. I was asked to present a paper on the development of the Online Court project in England and some of the thinking behind that project.

I have had an interest in this project since Professor Richard Susskind’s report on February 2015 and have followed the reports issued by Lord Briggs. There are two things of particular significance.

The first is that the project demonstrates the disruptive effect of technology and the way in which the deployment of technological solutions may result in quite significant changes in process without destroying or compromising the underlying  philosophies of a just system of dispute resolution provided by the State.

The second thing is the types of technology that may be deployed to make the online court work. The paper I prepared for the Conference looked at these two aspects of the matter along with a consideration of some of the positives and potential negatives of the project. Most of the negatives are in fact answerable.

The technological solutions that I considered were conceptual only and I wish I could have attended the July Online Courts hackathon in London. It is highly likely that the technical section of my paper would have had a completely different approach.

Here is a copy of the paper:

The powerpoint slides that were a part of the presentation follow

The session was live streamed and recorded and the video follows

I hope that this material is useful.

 

Imitating Paper

The Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016

The purpose of the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016 is to enable and govern the use of electronic technology in court and tribunal proceedings. It is overarching. All paper based processes in existing courts and tribunals may be interpreted as allowing electronic processes.
The Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act is posited upon the concept of functional equivalence – a theory which gives legal recognition to recording systems and their validation in a format other than paper. The Act in many respects reflects the principles that appear in the Electronic Transactions Act 2002 which did not apply to the Court system.
A central focus of the legislation is upon what is called a permitted document. The term “permitted document” means a document, including its associated process, in electronic form that is made by, or for use in, a court or tribunal. The purpose of the legislation is to facilitate the use of permitted documents in court and tribunal proceedings and allow existing references in enactments to documents to include permitted documents.
Not all documents are permitted documents and the legislation at section 4(2) lists those that do not qualify. These are:

(a) a document given on oath or by affirmation:
(b) a statutory declaration:
(c) a will, a codicil, or any other testamentary instrument:
(d) a power of attorney or an enduring power of attorney:
(e) a negotiable instrument:
(f) any notice required to be attached to any thing or left or displayed in any place:
(g) any warrant or other instrument authorising entry into premises or the search or seizure of any person or thing:
(h) any other document specified by the Governor-General by Order in Council made on the recommendation of the Minister:
(i) an item specified in any of paragraphs (a) to (h) that is required to be served by personal service.

The legislation effectively recognises that verification and authenticity of information contained in these classes of documents may only be provided by a tangible paper-based medium.
The Act does not mandate the use of electronic documents, although certain classes of persons yet to be defined in regulations may be required to use them.
The use of permitted documents requires the consent of the person using them although consent can be inferred from conduct. A person may not be compelled nor directed to use permitted documents. Thus, unless a person consents to the use of permitted documents it is paper by default.
Where there are requirements for information to be recorded, be in or be given in writing that information may be in a permitted document as long as it is readily accessible and useable for subsequent reference. This means that an electronic document must be accessible in the sense that it is not in archived or backup format and can be accessed presumably in native file format.
The legislation does recognise the dynamic nature of digital information and the reality that multiple copies may be made of a digital document that are identical to the “first” or source copy.
Where there is a requirement that multiple copies of information are to be provided, that requirement is met by providing a single electronic version of a permitted document and a requirement to provide information in a manner that complies with a paper based form met by permitted document if information is readily accessible and usable for subsequent reference.
Authentication and signature requirements provide a challenge for those used to verification of a document or its contents by a physical kinetic act such as affixing a seal or sign manual. How is that accomplished in a digital context?
Signature requirements for permitted documents are addressed in section 16 of the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act 2016. An “electronic signature” or verification must adequately indicate the approval of the information and must be “as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the signature is required.”
Importantly, electronic verification of a document is subject to an exception when one is witnessing a document. Witnessing requirements in a permitted document are met by an “electronic signature” if

a) The e-signature complies with the requirements of section 16
b) The e-signature adequately identifies the witness and indicates that the signature or seal has been witnessed
c) The e-signature is “as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the signature is required.”

If a permitted document requires a seal, that requirement may be met by an electronic seal if

a) The seal adequately identifies the party attaching it and
b) “is as reliable as is appropriate given the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which, the seal is required.”

The language echoes that dealing with electronic signatures. It is to be noted that the requirements for electronic signatures and seals refer to the issue of reliability. Section 19 of the Act sets out certain presumptions as to reliability and an electronic signature is presumed to be reliable if:

(a) the means of creating the electronic signature is linked to the signatory and to no other person; and
(b) the means of creating the electronic signature was under the control of the signatory and of no other person; and
(c) any alteration to the electronic signature made after the time of signing is detectable; and
(d) where the purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.

However, any other way of establishing reliability is not excluded and may be used.
The Act also sets out rules for the retention of permitted documents , for the dispatch and receipt of permitted documents. These provisions duplicate the provisions of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002. The filing requirements dispense with the requirement that a document be filed in a particular office of the Court and allow for the filing of a permitted document at any place specified in the regulations. In addition the place for filing may be physical or electronic and may be centralised or located within the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal.
Some important observations need to be made.

1. Although the Act has commenced it is not operative. Section 6 requires the Governor General by Order in Council made on the recommendation of the Minister to specify the Courts, tribunals or particular jurisdictions of Courts and Tribunals to which the Act applies. As matters stand, no such Order has been made. Once proper systems are in place to handle electronic filing the necessary orders will be made.

2. Will the Act significantly change Court processes. Except for the changes to place of filing rules, things will largely remain the same. This is because the legislation is imitative of existing processes. Imitative use of technology preserves existing processes and procedures but allows the same objectives to be achieved by electronic means. On the other hand the innovative use of technology allows for the introduction of disruptive and different procedures and processes enabled by the new technologies which ultimately result in a transformative and improved outcome.

3. Thus the legislation maintains the model of the paper based court system and adds a limited form of digital communications in the form of permitted documents – an electronic equivalent of paper.

If it was the intention of the Legislature to maintain the model of the paper based court system and add a limited form of digital communications in the form of permitted documents, the Electronic Courts and Tribunals Act has succeeded. But in reality the Act neither lives up to its name nor its promise. It does not, as its name might suggest, create or enable fully electronic courts or tribunals. All it allows is an electronic equivalent for paper. All the legislation does is to imitate paper.

From Theory to Practice – Software Models and Evidence for the Online Court

In the paper below I look at some of the ways in which technology may be applied to proposals for on-line Courts.

The proposals by Richard Susskind the JUSTICE paper and Lord Justice Sir Michael Briggs are based upon the availability of technical solutions to fulfil the promise inherent in the new models for resolving disputes. I emphasise that in using that phrase I envisage, as did Professor Susskind, the dispute resolution model to function within the established Court process rather than as a stand alone alternative to the Court process.

A consideration of the deployment of technology within the Court process first requires a recognition of the way in which technology can reflect or replace current processes. The Online Court proposals that have been put forward suggest significant process change but represent high level strategy. What I consider is a slightly more practical overview of some of the ways in which technology may be deployed. In addition there are issues surrounding the handling of digital evidence which will require consideration.

 

Information Governance and E-Discovery

In May of 2015 I had the pleasure and honour of sharing the stage with Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte at the IQPC 10th Anniversay Information Governance and eDiscovery Summit held at the Waldorf Hilton in London. The session was chaired by Chris Dale of the excellent and continually informative Edisclosure Information Project and addressed the Global Impact of eDiscovery and Information Governance within the context of data collection for cross border cases.

The session was allocated a generous ninety minutes of Conference time, starting shortly after 9:00 pm. This enabled the presenters to make a brief presentation on issues that appeared to be relevant to the general topic. My presentation addressed common themes present in the e-discovery regimes in the APAC region – Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong and New Zealand.

Following the presentations Chris led a discussion that covered a wide range of discovery and disclosure issues. The approach of the US Courts recently exemplified by the case of In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft (District Court SDNY M9-150/13-MJ-2814 29 August 2014 Judge Preska).

One of the common themes emerging from this discussion was that although a local court may purport to exercise “long arm” jurisdiction in the case of content located off-shore, compliance with local data disclosure requirements may come into play, rendering the disclosing party liable to possible sanctions if compliance is not forthcoming.

Another issue that we discussed was that of the need for lawyers to understand and appreciate the way in which technology is used in developing areas of law and in the ediscovery field in particular. In the United States an understanding of technology is a pre-requisite for competence to practice in some areas and as we move further and deeper into the Digital Paradigm, I consider this to be an absolute necessity. Not only lawyers. More and more cases involve aspects of technology either as the subject matter of the dispute or as an aspect of the evidence that is place before the Court. It is essential that Judges have a working knowledge of some of the more common information technologies. This is something of a contentious issue for there is a school of thought that suggests that judicial understanding of technology can be reached per medium of expert evidence. That proposition may have a limited degree of validity in the case of the subtle aspects of the workings of the technology, but should not extend to ocnstant and repetitious explanations of the general way which a packet switching network operates, or the nature of email metadata and how it operates.

The Conference was a valuable one. The sessions were extremely interesting and highly relevant, all of them presented by experts in the field. I am grateful to the organisers for inviting me and to Chris Dale for his excellent Chairmanship of our session and his insightful discussion management.

I prepared a paper for the Conference delegates and a copy is available on Scribd or may be perused here.

Technology for Better Fact Finding

This is a paper that I presented to the 14th International Criminal Law Congress in Melbourne on 11 October 2014. In brief it argues that new information technologies should be employed more widely in the Court system to enhance fact finding by juries and judges. It suggests that what are traditional means of evidence presentation, whilst still relevant, may be enhanced by technology use. In particular the paper questions whether the “confrontation right” requires physical presence and suggests that technology can allow virtual presence. It also points to new developments in 3D rendering and 3D printing which may enhance evidential integrity and improve presentation and consideration of evidence. The paper also questions whether some of the ritual aspects of the trial process enhance or impede proper and effective fact finding, or whether they have relevance to the primary function of the Court at all.

E-Discovery and Asia Legal Big Data

I had the privilege of being invited to take part in the Asia Legal Big Data Symposium held at the Conrad Hotel in Hong Kong on 29 – 30 April 2014, and to share a place on a panel which included Registrar Lung Kim Wan of the Hong Kong High Court, Senior Assistant Registrar Yeong Zee Kin from the Singapore Supreme Court and Stephen Yu from Alix Partners. The focus of the Conference was upon the imminent release of a Practice Direction for the Hong Kong Courts addressing E-Discovery. Although the present Hong Kong Rules are sufficiently wide to deal with E-Discovery in a broad sense, and more focussed approach is proposed.

The panel in which I participated dealt with existing rules and how they work in Singapore and New Zealand, and how the general shape of the Hong Kong direction may appear. Stephen Yu was able to bring valuable technical knowledge into the mix in considering some of the tools and technological solutions that may be utilised in the E-Discovery process.

The Symposium itself was an abundance of riches and as is so often the case, there were times when a difficult choice had to be made between which session to attend. Some of the sessions on data and information management within organisations were very interesting and helpful, emphasising the importance of how proper information management systems and policies can be helpful when a litigation hold is notified. Of particular interest was the way in which such policies may be used to resist spoliation allegations. A proper, principled inmjformation management policy may offer a reasonable explanation for why data is not immediately available or why it is no longer in existence.

It was also a pleasure to meet again Chris Dale from the E-Disclosure Information Project. I first met Chris in Singapore at a Conference a couple of years ago and we have kept in touch. Indeed I owe a debt to Chris for it was he who recommended my participation to the Conference organisers. Chris, as always, played a valuable part of the Hong Kong Conference, sharing his experiences and insights in the E-Discovery field and often was able to point out some of the shortcomings in the way in which E-Discovery Rules are working. One observation that he made was in the context of E-Discovery as a process.

The process starts often before litigation actually begins – when in fact it is contemplated. Parties should start considering their E-Discovery obligations at this time. The various stages of the process (reflected in the EDRM diagram – EDRM means Electronic Discovery Reference Model) continue through the the presentation of documents at Court. I think I should point out that I do not consider the E-Discovery process to be of the “tick the boxes” type of process, nor one which involves a slavish adherence to a set step by step approach. In my view the process is in the form of a journey which carries on throughout the life of the litigation and which involves a number of steps or stages together with an on-going obligation on the part of counsel to meet, confer and co-operate and a requirement by the Court by way of Case Management Conferences to ensure that discovery is reasonable and proportionate. The Court can keep a steady guiding hand on the wheel as the parties continue on the E-Discovery journey. Chris’s criticism of “E-Discovery as a process” was in the context of a slavish adherence to a step by step “plan” and I agree with that. But my view is that a process may have within it a certain flexibility. For example, a staged approach to electronic review may mean that different options become apparent as the review continues, allowing for modifications as review continues.

A copy of my paper delivered to the Symposium may be found below, along with a copy of my presentation.

 

 

Presentation